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ABSTRACT 
 
This sub-thesis examines the emergence of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) through 
its methods of recruitment and indoctrination. A branch of international Hizbut 
Tahrir (HT), in comparison to the performance of other transnational Islamist 
movements in Indonesia, HTI shows rapid mobilization, strong cadre building and 
a deep grasp of and adherence to central HT ideology. HT has been present in 
Indonesia since the early 1980s, initially as an underground organization, then 
from 2000, as a formal Islamist movement. The transition to democracy and the 
lifting of political restrictions at the end of the Soeharto regime in May, 1998 
facilitated the rise of HTI.   
 
This study focuses on the strategies and processes of recruitment and 
indoctrination employed by HTI, taking as a case study its members in Makassar, 
South Sulawesi. It will demonstrate the importance of innovative recruitment 
techniques and intensive indoctrination to understanding HTI's success. It will 
discuss HTI perspectives on da’wa (predication) and activities for recruitment and 
mobilization as outlined in their publications. Furthermore, through interviews 
conducted in the field, it will examine the experiences of rank and file members in 
dealing with their acquaintance with HTI and their processes of participation and 
membership. Most recruitment takes place through interpersonal relations 
between HTI members, the hizbiyyin and existing social networks. Furthermore, 
hizbiyyin actively seek converts by establishing and maintaining new social 
relationships in order to guide others to participate in HTI activities, before 
leading them to further levels of commitment. 
 
This sub-thesis will also explore how indoctrination has a determining role in 
creating dedicated hizbiyyin. This is mainly conducted through weekly halqa, or 
study clubs, which serve to keep new recruits learning, moulding their minds and 
behaviour and maintaining unity of thought among the members. Besides 
discussing the social background of hizbiyyin and the psychology of youth, it will 
show the impact of intensive indoctrination on them by analyzing their narratives 
given in interviews.  
 v
 GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
aqidah (Ar. aqīda): faith or belief 
BKIM, Badan Kerohanian Islam Mahasiswa: Student Association for Islamic 
Propagation 
BKK, Badan Kordinasi Kampus: Campus Coordinating Board 
BKLDK, Badan Koordinasi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus: Coordinating Board of 
the Institution of Campus Da'wa  
Caliph: successor to Muhammad as head of the Muslim community through the 
ages  
Caliphate: a single, centralized Islamic state, such as the Ottoman Empire 
Da’wa: Islamic missionary activity, proselytizing, also predication to make 
Muslims more observant Muslims 
daris (Ar. dāris): student 
Darul Islam: The Abode of Islam, also the name of an Islamic-state movement 
that rose up in rebellion against the central government in Indonesia, 
1948-1962 
Darul Kufr: The House of Unbelief 
Daulah Islam (Ar. ad-daula al-islamiyya): the Islamic state 
DDII, Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia: Islamic Predication Council of 
Indonesia 
Dema, Dewan Mahasiswa: Student governments 
DF, Dirasah Fardiyyah (Ar. dirāsa fardiyya): individual learning in HTI 
DPD I, Dewan Pimpinan Daerah I: Provincial Executive Committee of HTI 
DPD II, Dewan Pimpinan Daerah II: Executive Committee for District Level, HTI 
DPC, Dewan Pimpinan Cabang: Executive Committee for Sub-District Level, 
HTI 
fikrah (Ar. fikra): way of thinking, thought 
FOSIDI, Forum Studi Islam Ideologis: Forum of Islamic Ideological Studies 
FOSDIK, Forum Studi Islam Kontemporer: Forum of Contemporary Islamic 
Studies 
 vi
FPI, Front Pembela Islam: Islamic Defence Front 
GEMA Pembebasan, Gerakan Mahasiswa Pembebasan: Student Liberation 
Movement, an HTI university student organization  
Gerakan Tarbiyah: (Islamic) Education Movement  
Hadith: Traditions of the Prophet, collections of the sayings and practices of 
Muhammad  
halal (Ar. halāl): permitted, that which is allowed according to Islamic law  
halqa: circle, used in the sense of an Islamic study circle or club 
harakah (Ar. haraka): movement, in international Islam 
haram (Ar. harām): forbidden, sinful, that which is prohibited under Islamic law 
hizbiyyin (Ar. hizbiyyīn): members of Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia  
HMI, Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam: Muslim Student Association 
HT, Hizbut Tahrir: Party of Liberation 
HTI, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Indonesian Party of Liberation 
HTI Muslimah: women’s wing of HTI 
HUMAS, Hubungan Masyarakat: spokesperson for HTI 
Ijma’: agreement or consensus of expert legal opinions in Islam 
Ikhwanul Muslimin: Muslim Brotherhood, MB 
IMM, Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah: Muhammadiyah Student Association 
IPB, Institut Pertanian Bogor: Bogor Agricultural Institute 
jahiliyyah: ‘an ignorance of Islam’, referring both historically to the time before 
Islam and in contemporary times, a term used by the Muslim 
Brotherhood 
Jamaah Tabligh: Group for the propagation of Islam 
Jemaah Islamiyah, JI: Islamic Community, covert jihadist organization, founded 
in Malaysia in 1993 and based in Indonesia since 1998 
jihad: Literally ‘struggle’, denoting Islamic holy war; at present, the term is 
associated with violence under the banner of Islam   
kaffah (Ar. kāffah): total, comprehensive  
khalifah: caliph  
khilafah: caliphate 
kufur (Ar. kufr): unbeliever, infidel, unbelieving 
Laskar Jihad: Jihad Troops 
 vii
LDK, Lembaga Dakwah Kampus: Campus Da’wa Institution 
Lembaga Tahfidzul Qur’an: Institute for Qur’anic Memorisation  
LMD, Latihan Manajemen Dakwah: Preaching Management Training 
mabda’: basis of thinking, ideology 
mafahim: concepts 
maslahat: benefit, the common good 
MB, the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna; an 
organization stressing the completeness of Islam, pan-Islam and the need 
to defend Islam in holy war 
MIPA, Matematika dan Ilmu Pengetahuan Alam: Faculty of Mathematics and 
Science 
MM, Min Muqawwiwat: the title of HTI book Min Muqawwimat an-Nafsiyyah al-
Isamiyyah or Pillars of Islamic Personality 
MMI, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia: Council of Jihad Fighters of Indonesia 
MPR, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat: People’s Consultative Assembly, 
Indonesia’s supreme decision-making body 
MU, Mutaba’at Usbu’iyyah, study activity following weekly halqa in HTI 
Muhammadiyah: the largest modernist Muslim organization in Indonesia 
mushrif: supervisor (male)  
mushrifah: supervisor (female) 
mutabannat: most salient books by An-Nabhani used in halqa in HTI  
NKK, Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus: Normalisation of the Campuses, Ministry 
of Education policy controlling student action on the campuses, 1978 
NU, Nahdlatul Ulama: Revival of Muslim Scholars, the largest traditionalist 
Muslim organization in Indonesia 
Perda Shari’a: provincial bylaws permitting the implementation of shari’a 
pesantren: traditional Islamic boarding school in Indonesia 
PII, Pelajar Islam Indonesia: Indonesian Muslim Students association 
PKS, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Prosperity and Justice Party 
PMII, Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia: Indonesian Muslim Students 
Movement. NU's tertiary students organization formed in 1960  
PNS, Pegawai Negeri Sipil: Indonesian government employees 
 viii
PPP, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan: Unified Development Party, amalgam of 
Islamic parties under regime pressure in 1973 
Al-Qur'an: the holy book of Islam 
Salafi: general term for movements that seek to return to the example of the early 
generations of Muslims; in recent decades it has been used to denote the 
most strictly puritanical of these movements 
santri: student at traditional Islamic boarding school, also a pious Muslim  
shari'a: Islamic law  
shura: consultation and deliberation, often refers to the basic notion of democracy 
in Islam.  
Sunnah (Ar. Sunna): normative practice or exemplary behaviour of Muhammad   
tabanni (Ar. tabannī): process of adopting ideas, term used in HT 
tadarruj: gradualism, term used by the Muslim Brotherhood 
takbir (Ar. takbīr): proclamation of  “Allahu Akbar” (God is Most Great)  
tariqah (Ar. tarīqa): method or way 
tatsqif (Ar. tathqīf): culturing, HT term 
thaqafa mutabannah: adopted canon of Hizbut Tahrir  
thaqafa ghayr mutabannah: un-adopted canon of Hizbut Tahrir   
tsaqafah (Ar. thaqafa): culture; in HTI usage canon, knowledge or insight 
UI, Universitas Indonesia: The University of Indonesia 
UIN Alauddin, Universitas Islam Negeri Alauddin: State Islamic University of 
Alauddin, formerly Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN), State Institute 
for Islamic Studies    
UMI, Universitas Muslim Indonesia: Indonesian Muslim University  
umma: community of believers, the community of Muslims 
UNHAS, Universitas Hasanuddin: Hasanuddin University  
UNM, Universitas Negeri Makassar: State University of Makassar  
Waspol, Wawasan Politik: political insight, term used in HTI 
 
NOTE:  the rendering of Arabic terms and proper names follows both 
international convention and Indonesian usage by Hizbut Tahrir 
Indonesia. No diacritics are given in the thesis. 
 
 ix
 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
Declaration ~ i 
Acknowledgements ~ ii      
Abstract ~ v        
Glossary and abbreviations ~ vi  
Table of contents ~ x 
 
  
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ~ 1 
 
Background ~ 1 
Scope of the Study and Research Questions ~ 4  
Significance of the Study ~ 5 
Review of Related Literature ~ 7 
Main Arguments ~ 12 
Methodological Notes ~ 13 
The Structure of the Sub-Thesis ~ 15 
  
CHAPTER TWO: THE EMERGENCE OF HIZBUT TAHRIR 
INDONESIA ~ 17 
 
Introduction ~ 17 
Hizbut Tahrir: Origins and Ideology ~ 18 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Beginnings, Socio-Political Context and Development ~ 
23 
Origins of Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia ~ 23 
The Campus Da’wa Movement and HTI in New Order Indonesia ~ 25 
HTI in the Post-Authoritarian Regime: Towards Engaging with the Umma ~ 30 
 Organizing Rallies and Demonstrations ~ 31 
 Organizing Public Seminars ~ 32 
 Creating Media ~ 32 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia in South Sulawesi ~33 
Conclusion ~ 37 
 
CHAPTER THREE: DA’WA AND RECRUITMENT ~ 39 
 
Introduction ~ 39 
HTI as a Radical Da’wa Movement: Da’wa Methods and Recruitment ~ 41 
HTI Recruitment in Makassar ~ 45 
 HTI Trainings and Seminars as a Medium for Recruitment ~ 46 
 Recruitment Through Interpersonal Bonds ~ 50 
The Joining Process in HTI ~ 53 
 x
 Cognitive Opening ~ 54 
 Religious Seeking ~ 56 
 Socialization ~ 57 
Conclusion ~ 60 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: INDOCTINATING HIZBIYYIN: SEEKING 
CERTAINTY THROUGH AN-NABHANISM ~ 61 
 
Introduction ~ 61 
Indoctrinating An-Nabhanism Through Halqa ~ 62 
 Halqa and the Indoctrinating Process ~ 64 
 Texts as a Basis for Indoctrination ~ 67 
Youth and Susceptibility to HTI Indoctrination ~ 69 
 Seeking Social Bonds and Relief from Frustration ~ 70 
 Seeking Certainty ~ 73 
Indoctrinated Narratives: Becoming a Re-born Muslim ~ 75 
 Islam as a Total Ideology ~ 75 
 The Quest for Shari’a and the Caliphate ~ 76 
 Resistance to Western Concepts: Against Capitalism and Democracy ~ 78 
Self-Transformation: Producing a New Identity ~ 79 
Conclusion ~ 81 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION ~ 83 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ~ 89  
 
References ~ 89 
Interviews ~ 95 
 xi
  
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Background 
On 12 August 2007, the stadium Gelora Bung Karno Jakarta was filled with 
some eighty thousand Muslims attending an international caliphate conference 
held by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI, Indonesian Party of Liberation). Cries of 
the takbir, ‘Allahu Akbar’ proclaiming the greatness of God rang through the 
stadium as invited speakers from different countries called for the restoration 
of the caliphate, the introduction of Islamic shari’a law, and the unity of the 
umma. Never before in Indonesian history had such a large rally called for the 
re-establishment of universal Islamic governance and a rejection of western 
ideologies. Indeed, Hizbut Tahrir is a transnational Islamist movement which 
pursues a global agenda. The mass participation of HTI members in this 
international conference signalled the growing popularity of transnational 
Islamist movements in Indonesia. 
 
The emergence of transnational Islamist movements has in part marked the 
return of Islamic radicalism in post-Soeharto Indonesia. The fall of Soeharto's 
authoritarian New Order regime on 21 May 1998 led to democratization and 
openness. Many political aspirations and expressions which were suppressed in 
the old regime could now be voiced and contested. The rise of political Islam is 
one consequence of this. The tendencies of political Islam in post-New Order 
Indonesia have been expressed through the establishment of a large number of 
‘Islamic parties’ using Islam as their ideological basis; the implementation of 
shari’a in several provinces through bylaws (Perda Shari’a); the proliferation 
of  radical Islamic groups such as Laskar Jihad (Jihad Troops), Front Pembela 
Islam (FPI, or Islamic Defence Front), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and Majelis 
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1Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Council of Jihad Fighters of Indonesia);  and the 
mushrooming of Islamist media.2 This phenomenon prompted a questioning of 
the general perception that Indonesian Islam is both moderate and peaceful.   
 
The existence of Islamist movements in Indonesia has gained attention from 
both the international media and academics, especially in the wake of the 9/11 
2002 attack in the USA and several bombing incidents in Indonesia. This was 
due to the involvement of a number of groups, such as Laskar Jihad and 
Jemaah Islamiyah in violence and terrorism. As a result, some analysts and 
scholars suspected the presence of an al-Qaeda network in Southeast Asia, 
particularly Indonesia.3 In this regard, there is a tendency to regard the Islamist 
movement in Indonesia as inspired by that of the Middle East and as ‘militant’ 
and therefore violent. This tendency, however, overlooks the fact that some 
transnational Middle Eastern Islamist movements, such as Gerakan Tarbiyah 
and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia use peaceful means in achieving their goals. 
Ayoob is right to state that “most contemporary transnational Islamist activities 
do not fall within the jihadist description”.4 In this respect, it should be noted 
that transnational Islamist movements take various forms, ranging from 
missionary activity (da'wa) to overtly political concerns.5
 
Due to its political concern and uncompromising stance, I categorize Hizbut 
Tahrir as an ‘Islamist’ and ‘radical’ movement. Islamism is generally viewed 
as the concept or discourse which regards Islam as a political ideology.6 In this 
respect, “Islamists see Islam not as a mere religion, but as a political ideology 
                                                 
1 Azyumardi Azra, “Political Islam in Post-Soeharto Indonesia”, in Virginia Hooker and Amin 
Saikal (eds.), Islamic Perspectives on the New Millennium (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2004) 133-34. 
2 Syamsul Rijal, “Media and Islamism in Post-New Order Indonesia: The Case of Sabili”, 
Studia Islamika 12: 3 (2005) 421-74. 
3 See for example, Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: 
Colombia University Press, 2002); Zachari Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible 
of Terror (Boulder and London: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 2003). 
4 Mohammed Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim 
World (USA: The University of Michigan Press, 2008) 134. 
5 Ibid. 134-35. 
6 Oliver Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (London: I.B.Taurus Publishers, 1994) ix; Bobby 
S. Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentralism and the Emergence of Islamism (London and 
New York: Zed Books, 1997) 17. 
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7that should reshape all aspects of society”.  Fitting in this category, HT 
conceives Islam as ideology (mabda') and a complete system which should rule 
all aspects of Muslim lives, including politics, economy, law, foreign affairs 
and so forth. To uphold this 'complete system', Islamists share a common view 
on the need of the implementation of shari'a, but they adopt different methods, 
ranging from accommodation to rejection of Western concepts. Among 
Indonesian Islamist movements, its is HTI which shows a more radical position 
as it struggles to re-establish a global caliphate in order to replace the existing 
system of nation-state governance. However, the term ‘radical’ in this sense 
has no connotation with violent action. Rather, it refers to the HT notion which 
seeks to bring dramatic change in the system of government by propagating a 
total rejection of ideologies and ideas derived from the West.  
 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia is deserving of academic attention for several reasons. 
Firstly, it is part of a global movement which imports its ideology from the 
Middle East and has a clearly transnational political agenda. Emphasizing 
Islam as its sole ideology, HTI is not reluctant to reject Western ideologies and 
ideas, such as capitalism, secularism, democracy and the sovereign nation-
state. In Indonesia, this kind of Islam appears new and somewhat alien for the 
Muslim majority who follow the mass organizations of the traditionalist 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the modernist Muhammadiyah. Secondly, in 
contrast to these organizations, HTI does not involve itself in parliamentary 
politics, and yet it has attracted a growing membership. In relation to its size, 
HTI officials avoid mentioning exact numbers. However, Fealy estimates an 
HTI membership of at least several tens of thousands8 and I predict this 
number will gradually increase in the future. Although HTI is still a small 
minority group, its rallies and campaigning have won extensive media 
coverage. On all of these counts, it is important to explain the factors which 
draw people to participate in this particular transnational Islamist movement.  
                                                 
7 Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Umma (London: Hurst Company, 
2004) 58. 
8 Greg Fealy, “Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia: Seeking a 'Total' Islamic Identity”, in Shahram 
Akbarzadeh and Fethi Mansouri (eds.), Islam and Political Violence: Muslim Diaspora and 
Radicalism in the West (London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007) 156. 
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One method of researching the motivations and processes of people in joining 
such a movement is through an ethnographic study. Analyzing the social, 
political and economic contexts of a phenomenon is not sufficient, as the actors 
are subjects who respond in particular ways to their surrounding realities. 
Ethnography allows us to understand the way in which Islamist groups express 
their faith and identity by exploring worldview, feelings and experiences. This 
is because the task of ethnography is “to investigate some aspects of the lives 
of the people who are being studied, and this includes how these people view 
the situations they face, how they regard one another, and also how they see 
themselves”.9 This study, therefore, will seek to explain the process of 
participation of people in HTI and the meanings and identity they attach to 
their affiliation.  
 
Scope of the Study and Research Questions 
This study deals with Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, focussing on the rank-and-file 
members who dedicate themselves to the organisation. Since HTI has grown 
most rapidly in the big cities in Indonesia, I will take Makassar, South 
Sulawesi as a case study. There are two reasons for choosing this city. First, 
Makassar is both the capital city of South Sulawesi and the largest city in 
Eastern Indonesia, serving as the central base of HTI's recruitment in this 
region. Secondly, South Sulawesi is a province which has historical linkage to 
staunchly Islamic kingdoms of the past and an armed rebellion, Darul Islam 
(The Abode of Islam) led by Kahar Muzakkar (1950-1965).10 Its dominant 
ethnic groups, namely the Bugis and Makassarese, are strongly attached to 
their Islamic identity,11 and recently some of its regencies, such as Bulukumba 
                                                 
9 Martyn Hammersley and Paul Atkinson, Ethnography: Principles in Practice (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2007) 3. 
10 For a good account of Darul Islam in South Sulawesi, see Barbara Sillars Harvey, Traditions, 
Islam, and Rebellion: South Sulawesi, 1950-1965, Unpublished Ph.D Thesis (Chicago: Cornell 
University, 1974). 
11 See Mattulada, “Islam di Sulawesi Selatan”, in Taufik Abdullah (ed.), Agama dan 
Perubahan Sosial (Jakarta: Rajawali, 1983) 209-322; Christian Pelras, “Religion, Tradition, 
and the Dynamics of Islamization in South Sulawesi”, Indonesia 57, Achipel (April 1993) 133-
54.  
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have implemented Islamic shari’a through bylaws (Perda Shari’a). This study 
seeks to understand the participation process and appeal of HTI based on its 
members’ own perspectives, regarding them as ethnographic subjects who 
speak for themselves.                
 
The act of participation and commitment to Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia is pivotal 
to this study. The central research question is: why and how young Indonesian 
Muslims join and become commited to HTI? In this respect, recruitment and 
conversion processes to HTI will be explored. The social background of the 
members and socio-political settings will be investigated. The study also asks: 
why did recruits choose HTI rather than one of the many Islamic organizations 
in Indonesia? How far has their participation in HTI had an impact on or 
transformed their individual and social lives? Furthermore, this study also 
investigates the process of their acquaintance with HTI and mechanisms of 
indoctrination in the movement.  
 
Significance of the Study 
Many works from various perspectives have been written in order to explain 
the rise of religious fundamentalism in the contemporary globalizing world. 
The explanation often emphasized is that religious fundamentalism is a 
manifestation of a crisis of identity among believers, with the believers 
attempting to preserve a distinctive identity by returning to the past.12 
According to Ruthven, fundamentalist groups are engaged in a ‘search for 
meaning’ in the midst of the era of globalization.13 In the context of the 
Muslim world, the explanation of Islamic fundamentalism in relation to 
identity formation is more complex and profound. In Muslim countries, Islamic 
radical movements have used Islamic identity as a means of cultural reassertion 
and resistance against the perceived ills of Western imperialism, modernization 
and globalisation. In several cases, the movements reassert their Islamic 
                                                 
12 Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.), Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the 
Sciences, the Family and Education (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 
1993) 3.  
13 See Malise Ruthven, Fundamentalism: The Search for Meaning (New York: Oxford, 2004). 
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identity in opposition to secular and authoritarian governments as well as to 
local traditions, which are perceived to be not ‘Islamic’ enough for them. 
Noorhaidi Hasan, who studied Laskar Jihad, notes that both the impact of 
globalisation and Indonesian domestic problems contribute to the appeal of 
Islamic radical movements for young Muslims seeking some form of 
certainty.14 This study will examine whether this assumption holds true for 
HTI members based in Makassar, South Sulawesi. 
 
Looking at international Hizbut Tahrir (HT), several works have attempted to 
explain the rise and appeal of the movement among young Muslims. Some of 
these have drawn on the relationship between Islam and globalization. Roy, for 
instance, refers to the term ‘globalised Islam’ in order to explain how Muslims 
in the West are affected by globalisation, westernisation and their position as a 
minority.15 Such Muslims of the younger generation who are questioning 
religious authority and who find themselves caught between Western culture 
and the localised culture of their parents are prone to join transnational 
movements offering instead the global Islamic identity of the umma (Islamic 
community). However, most studies of Hizbut Tahrir are taken from Europe 
and Central Asia, while little attention has been given to HT in Southeast Asia, 
especially in countries where Muslims are a majority. Indonesia, boasting the 
largest Muslim population in the world, provides an interesting case where HT 
has gradually grown and expanded without facing political pressure from the 
state, as has happened in certain Arab countries. Accordingly, this study seeks 
to fill this gap. As the research is conducted in South Sulawesi, this study will 
also enrich the literature about Islam in Eastern Indonesia, a region sadly 
neglected by scholars. More importantly, it will see the dynamics and 
development of HTI in a regional context.    
 
                                                 
14 Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New 
Order Indonesia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2006). 
15 See Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. For a comparison, see also Peter 
Mandaville, Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2001).  
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Review of Related Literature                
In global scholarship, the current works on Hizbut Tahrir have been written 
mainly from the perspectives of security experts and social movement 
theorists. The former has a tendency to identify whether the organisation poses 
a potential threat of violence while the latter seeks to explain the causal 
emergence and development of HT, using political opportunity structure, 
resource mobilization and framing.16 All studies of this kind assess pertinent 
elements of HT such as ideology, political context, networking, recruitment 
strategies and activities. Little attention, however, has been paid to explaining 
the movement from the points of view of its rank-file members.  
 
In the Indonesian context, there have been several works on Hizbut Tahrir 
Indonesia using theories of fundamentalism and social movements. Most are 
generally concerned with the question of the ideology, emergence and 
activities of HTI. The works of Rihlah Nur Aulia17 18 and Syamsul Arifin,  for 
instance, deal with HTI in an attempt to decide whether it can be categorized as 
an Islamic fundamentalist movement. Aulia delineates six characteristics of 
Islamic fundamentalism which include: 1) scripturalist understanding of Islam, 
2) viewing religion as a complete system, 3) being fanatics, exclusive, radical, 
militant and intolerant, 4) countering modern ideologies, 5) truth monopoly and 
6) opposing pluralism and relativism. She then uses these characteristics to 
analyse four HTI ideas on the Islamic caliphate, the concept of shura, the 
relation between Islam and the state and women and politics. Aulia comes to 
                                                 
16 For the former studies see for example: International Crisis Group, “Radical Islam in Central 
Asia: Responding to the Threat of Hizb ut-Tahrir”, in ICG Asia Report 58, 30 June, available 
at: www.crisisweb.org, 2; Jean-Francois Mayer, “Hizb ut-Tahrir The Next Al-Qaida, Really?”, 
PSIO Occasional Paper 4 (2004); Emmanuel Karagiannis and Clark McCauley, “Hizb ut-
Tahrir al-Islami: Evaluating the Threat Posed by a Radical Islamic Group That Remains 
Nonviolent”, in Terrorism and Political Violence 18 (2006) 315-334; Didier Chaudet, “Hizb 
ut-Tahrir: An Islamist Threat to Central Asia?”, in Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 26, 1 
(2006) 113-115. For the latter studies see: Emmanuel Karagiannis, “Political Islam in 
Uzbekistan: Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami”, in Europe-Asia Studies 58: 2 (March 2006) 261-280; 
Emmanuel Karagiannis, “The Rise of Political Islam in Kazakhstan: Hizb Ut-Tahrir Al 
Islami”, in Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 13 (2007) 297-322.   
17 Rihlah Nur Aulia, Fundamentalisme Islam Indonesia: Studi atas Gerakan dan Pemikiran 
Hizbut Tahrir, M.A. Thesis (Jakarta: UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, 2004). 
18 Syamsul Arifin, Ideologi dan Praksis Gerakan Sosial Kaum Fundamentalis: Pengalaman 
Hizb al-Tahrir Indonesia (Malang: UMM Press, 2005). 
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the conclusion that HTI does represent an Islamic fundamentalist movement. In 
a similar vein, Arifin explains in his work what he calls “the ideology 
construction and type of social movement of HTI”. The author emphasizes the 
important role of Islam as ideology in HTI's agenda. He concludes that HTI 
could be categorized as a social movement which combines redemptive, 
transformative and revolutionary types. However, Arifin does not elaborate in 
depth on HTI using the social movement theories current among contemporary 
scholars. In this respect, he merely presents a descriptive analysis of HTI's 
ideology, da'wa process and activities. Both of these authors are more 
concerned with the fundamentalist ideology and the rhetoric of the movement 
represented within HTI publications and the leaders' voices rather than those of 
the members themselves. 
 
Several other works provide a profile and general assessment of HTI. The book 
by Khamami Zada19 is the work most referred to by scholars of Islamist 
movements in Indonesia, since it was the first to deal with the proliferation of 
what he calls ‘radical Islamic groups’ in the transition era after the fall of 
Soeharto. The book includes HTI along with other Islamist movements such as 
Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Laskar Jihad, Ikhwanul Muslimin (The Muslim 
Brotherhood) and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI). Zada argues that the 
emergence of the movements is caused by two factors: first, disillusionment 
with the state which has failed to bring stability makes certain people turn to 
Islamic shari’a as a solution; and second, the domination and hegemony of the 
West in Muslim countries generates Islamic solidarity to resist the West. This 
author, however, provides no more than a general discussion of the issues by 
examining the common socio-political characteristics of all Islamist 
movements in terms of ideas and actions. The book does not contain a detailed 
discussion, or even a brief profile of the Islamist movements, including Hizbut 
Tahrir Indonesia.         
 
                                                 
19 Khamami Zada, Islam Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas-ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia 
(Jakarta: Teraju, 2002). 
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20Jamhari and Jahroni,  in their edited work of Gerakan Salafi Radikal, include 
HTI in the framework of radical salafi movements emerging after the fall of 
the New Order. They argue that the rise of Islamic radical movements, 
including HTI, is the direct political consequence of the fall of the authoritarian 
state. Without employing any particular perspective or theory, their work gives 
an introductory account of HTI, along with other movements, delineating its 
historical background and ideology based on the ideas of An-Nabhani, the 
founder of Hizbut Tahrir and on HTI publications. While discussing the origin 
and emergence of HTI on Indonesian secular university campuses, it also 
discusses the main agendas of HTI, such as the establishment of shari’a and 
the caliphate, as well as building an Islamic economic system. The work, 
however, falls into sweeping generalizations by characterizing the various 
Islamist movements, either transnational or local, under the common category 
of ‘salafi’. This is problematic as several movements do not regard their 
ideology as salafi. Moreover, it focuses more on socio-political factors in 
explaining the rise of the movement without exploring its internal strategies 
and activities.     
 
21A different view is provided by Imadadun Rakhmat,  who traces the 
transmission of what he calls ‘Islamic revivalism’ from the Middle East to 
Indonesia through such avenues as the Tarbiyah Movement, the Salafi 
Movement, and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, arguing that the ideology and 
methods of these movements are transmitted from the Middle East with no 
local modification. Rakhmat discusses a brief history of HT's emergence, 
da'wa methods and its strategies, both to survive and to expand its influence 
and networks. In addition, he briefly traces the first penetration of HTI ideas 
through figures such as M. Mustofa and Abdurrahman Al-Baghdadi to students 
at the tertiary Bogor Institute of Agriculture (Institut Pertanian Bogor, IPB). 
Although the author is successful in demonstrating the links of transmission of 
Islamic revivalism, he seems to treat each of the three movements 
                                                 
20 Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni (eds.), Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia (Jakarta: Rajawali 
Pers, 2004).  
21 M. Imdadun Rakhmat, Arus Baru Islam Radikal (Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga, 2005). 
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independently, while overlooking their respective context and dynamics. This 
study also excludes a discussion of the recruitment and participation of people 
in HTI. 
 
Particular attention to the discourse of HTI has been paid by Muhammad Iqbal 
Ahnaf.22 He analyzes the ways in which it is expressed and articulated by two 
radical Islamic groups in Yogyakarta, namely HTI and Majelis Mujahidin 
Indonesia (MMI), especially in the creation of what he calls ‘the image of the 
other as enemy’. Critically examining the actual words and images of HTI and 
MMI publications, speeches, and activities, Ahnaf finds four discourse patterns 
used in constructing the ‘other’: ideologization, demonization, insistence on the 
idea of the ‘clash of civilizations’ and imagining the victory of Islam. For the 
author, the image construction of the ‘other’ as enemy represents a ‘symbolic 
violence’ which has the potential to incite actual physical violence. Besides 
analyzing flaws in the arguments of these groups, especially those related to 
doctrinal justification, he also postulates that their radical arguments are 
counterproductive, considering the fact that Indonesian society is religiously 
and ethnically plural. Positioning HTI and MMI in the same category runs the 
risk of sweeping generalization. In this case, the author unfortunately does not 
examine the differences of the two organizations in discourse production. This 
is an important consideration, as the former is a transnational movement while 
the latter is a purely local one. Moreover, Ahnaf often makes inadequate 
descriptions of Islamic terms, historical narratives and Islamist organizations. 
He, for instance, states that MMI is far better than HTI in terms of 
organizational structure and leadership, while the fact is in the reverse.23  
 
24 25The works of Agus Salim  and Greg Fealy  have provided current social 
perspectives in explaining HTI. Salim's work is the first to apply contemporary 
                                                 
22 Muhammad Iqbal Ahnaf, The Image of the Other as Enemy (Thailand: Silkworm Books, 
2006). 
23 See Ibid., p. 6.  
24 Agus Salim, The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (1982-2004): Its Political Opportunity 
Structure, Resource Mobilization, and Collective Action Frames, Unpublished MA Thesis 
(Jakarta: Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, 2005). 
25 Fealy, “Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia”, 151-164.  
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social movement theories to explain the rise of Islamic activism in Indonesia. 
Salim analyses the rise of HTI from 1982 to 2004 using three social movement 
theories, namely political opportunity structure, resource mobilization and 
collective action frames. Providing rich data, he explores the earlier emergence 
of HTI and its transformation from quietism to collective action and political 
activism. He observes three periods in the emergence of HTI: first, a 
hibernation phase (1982 to 1999), a formative phase (2000) and an escalating 
phase (2002-2004). He argues that HTI's emergence was precipitated by its 
grievances with the Indonesian multi-dimensional crisis, facilitated by political 
opportunity structure and supported by its mobilizing capacity, frames and 
ideas. Salim does not, however, elaborate on young Muslims’ response to 
HTI's ideology and frames and the process of their acquaintance and 
engagement in HTI. 
 
Fealy, while examining the history, structure and discourse of HTI, is more 
concerned with the definition of Islamic identity and the nature of its appeal to 
HTI members. He argues that “HTI's metanarrative or totalizing account of the 
condition of the Muslim world and the remedy for its problems” should be 
taken into account in order to understand Hizbut Tahrir's appeal. Borrowing 
post-modernist notions of metanarrative, Fealy shows how HTI has made use 
of metanarrative in its discourse, as can be seen in its publications and power 
point presentations. Critically examining the discourse, Fealy comes to 
conclusion that it is HT's radical agenda which attracts people to join the 
organization. In this case, he asserts that the appeal of Hizbut Tahrir lies in its 
‘total’ Islamic identity, which indeed is often emphasized by HTI. Focusing on 
HTI's meta-narratives, his study does not deal with recruitment and 
indoctrination as the way of creating its members, the hizbiyyin. 
 
Ken Ward, in a recent article, examines HTI's current position by discussing its 
origin, its ideology and its strategies for achieving power.26 He provides a 
critical analysis on HTI's stance towards violence and terrorism as well as the 
                                                 
26 Ken Ward, “Non-violent Extremists? Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia”, Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 63: 3 (June 2009) 149-164. 
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Indonesian government's response to the movement. Although HTI rejects acts 
of violence, he analyses that the movement “does not eschew violent rhetoric. 
Its language is indeed often vitriolic as it denounces the enemies of Islam, the 
indigenous servants of capitalism and imperialism, or the assorted social ills 
that those forces have inflicted on Indonesia.”27 In addition, he shows several 
cases where HTI did not directly denounce Muslim acts of violence and 
terrorism but described them as the result of Western manipulation and 
conspiracy. Ward also explains that the Indonesian government has not taken 
harsh measures to contain radical Muslim groups to avoid being criticized as 
‘anti-Islam’. Predicting HTI is likely to grow, he doubts the movement can 
gain political power in the near future considering the gap between HTI's goal 
and ‘traditional Indonesian national aspiration’.28 In his article, however, Ward 
does not provide a discussion of HTI's recruitment and participation processes.          
 
Having reviewed publications relating to HTI, it is clear that none of works 
have seriously attempted to investigate the factors which make young Muslims 
join and make a commitment to the movement. Among them, Fealy's work 
comes closest to my study in dealing with HTI’s appeal to its members. Yet, 
the process of recruitment and indoctrination is not examined. Therefore, I will 
attempt to fill this gap in our knowledge.  
 
Main Arguments 
This study argues that both recruitment strategy and indoctrination have played 
crucial roles in achieving high participation in HTI and the commitment of its 
members. Compared to other Islamist groups, HTI members are more active 
and committed, as can be seen in their strict adoption of HT ideology in 
thinking and practice, their intensity in attending halqa and HTI public events 
and their energetic activities in disseminating HTI messages and recruiting new 
members under the name of da'wa. Recruitment is systematically undertaken 
by HTI either through public activities or personal contact. I found that most 
recruitment takes place through interpersonal ties. In this respect, hizbiyyin 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 158. 
28 Ibid., 162. 
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utilize pre-existing social networks by approaching and guiding their friends 
and relatives to participate in HTI activities. In addition, they actively make 
new acquaintances in order to direct new contacts to HTI. In approaching 
prospective members, hizbiyyin use intellectual and emotional arguments rather 
than spiritual. I also point out that participation in HTI is not a sudden process, 
as there is a lengthy training and induction scheme to follow, namely studying 
several selected HTI texts and showing dedication and sacrifice to the 
movement, before moving to induction. Borrowing a sociological model of 
conversion and theory of joining Islamic radical groups, I will show three 
processes of joining in HTI: cognitive opening, religious seeking and 
socialization.   
 
While recruitment works to attract people to initial participation, indoctrination 
through halqa, on the other hand, is essential in order to change the 
perspectives of recruits and implant in them HTI beliefs. Young Muslims, 
especially those who experience crisis and alienation are more susceptible to 
HTI indoctrination. HTI's religious messages and utopian promises wrapped in 
revolutionary language are appealing to young adults who seek power and 
identity. In the movement, disaffected youth can gain certainty, social bonds 
and relief from anxiety. Halqa works not only to keep recruits learning by 
shaping their thinking, but also maintains their uniformity of thought and 
deepens their belief in HTI. Added to this, social interaction among members 
helps to maintain their commitment to HTI as the movement provides a strong 
solidarity and control mechanism among them.  
 
Methodological Notes    
This study takes an interdisciplinary approach based on literature research, in-
depth interviews and participant observation. It attempts to explain the Muslim 
engagement in Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia in Makassar, South Sulawesi. 
Literature research in this study includes survey bibliographies of 
fundamentalism studies, new religious movements, scholarly works on HTI 
and HTI publications. The primary data in this study is collected from 
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interviews, observation and HTI publications, while the others are secondary. I 
analysed numerous HTI texts which are used in intensive halqa. Moreover, I 
observed HTI pamphlets hanging on information boards of several university 
campuses in Makassar. The messages and advertisements on pamphlets are 
important to analyse in conjunction with the recruitment strategy on campus. 
Since my study deals more closely with HTI members themselves, I conducted 
in-depth interviews and participant observation during fieldwork of two 
months. The interview with hizbiyyin and HTI leaders was not always easy 
since the local spokesperson (HUMAS DPD I) restricted opportunities for me 
to interview members, except while in his presence, arguing that the 
spokesperson is the only representative of HTI to provide valid information to 
journalists and researches. This situation led me to find informants on several 
campuses by seeking information from friends, the pamphlets and attending 
HTI activities. Many male hizbiyyin were reluctant to be interviewed, while 
female ones were relatively open, as long as they were accompanied by their 
friends during the interview. However, many of my informants felt suspicious 
towards me, worrying that I was an ‘agent of the West’ (antek Barat) who 
studied them for the project of weakening their movement. Yet, by explaining 
that my research was purely for academic purposes and expressing sympathy 
with their struggle I could overcome this communication barrier. In order to 
protect my informants, I refer to them using pseudonyms, except in the case of 
the local HTI leaders.   
 
The in-depth interviews were conducted to investigate the motivation of the 
members, their views on Islam and social realities, their individual experiences 
and feelings before and after joining HTI, as well as their social background. In 
this regard, use of a life-history technique was important. I interviewed twenty 
HTI members, comprising five professionals and fifteen students from four 
universities: Universitas Hasannuddin (UNHAS), Universitas Negeri Makassar 
(UNM), Universitas Muslim Indonesia (UMI) and Universitas Islam Negeri 
Alauddin (UIN Alauddin). In addition, I interviewed two local leaders of HTI 
in South Sulawesi (spokesperson and HTI Muslimah leader of DPD I) aiming 
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at tracing the history and development of HTI in the region and the recruitment 
strategies employed in expanding the membership.  
 
Participant observation was essential in order to see members’ behaviour and 
commitment. I gained opportunities to engage with hizbiyyin in the 
movement’s public activities, including a national Muslimah seminar, a 
monthly Halqah Peradaban (Halqa of Civilization) seminar, and two long 
marches: one following the national Muslimah seminar, which coincided with 
Mother's Day (Hari Ibu) and the other was commemorating Islamic New Year. 
During a seminar and rallies, I took photos and recorded speeches, 
presentations and orations, as well as collecting their papers and leaflets. In 
order to understand their feelings and their spirit of motivation, I joined the 
long marches with hizbiyyin for several kilometres and interacted informally 
with them. This interaction also allowed me to ease my relationship with HTI 
members for leading on to further interviews.     
 
 
The Structure of the Sub-Thesis  
This sub-thesis comprises five chapters. Chapter One is an introduction which 
includes background, scope of study and key questions, significance of the 
research, literature review, methodology and sub-thesis structure.   
 
Chapter Two discusses the emergence of Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia. It begins 
by introducing HT origins and ideology as background. Further, it provides a 
brief discussion of the origin and general development of HTI in Indonesia 
from the authoritarian New Order Era to the post-Soeharto era, along with its 
socio-political contexts. Aside from global factors, it shows how the nature of 
the state influences the way HTI has developed in terms of mobilization and 
expansion. Subsequently, it illustrates the local development of HTI in South 
Sulawesi. 
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Chapter Three examines da'wa and recruitment activities of HTI in South 
Sulawesi. The doctrinal basis of da'wa, its methods and activities are first 
provided in order to understand the missionary nature of the movement. The 
chapter then examines the strategies and the processes of HTI recruitment in 
South Sulawesi, ranging from seminars and discussions to interpersonal 
relations. Next, it analyses the processes of conversion to HTI using 
perspectives from several works on new religious movements and radical 
Islamic groups. It underlines three processes of participation in HTI: cognitive 
opening, religious seeking and socialization. 
 
Chapter four examines HTI indoctrination and its impact on young Muslims. It 
begins by examining the methods and processes of indoctrination in the 
movement. Next, it explains the nature of the young adults and the social 
composition of HTI members in Makassar in relation to their susceptibility to 
HTI ideology and indoctrination. Finally, this chapter deals with the strong 
impact of intensive indoctrination upon hizbiyyin by analysing their 
indoctrinated narratives on Islam as a total ideology, the quest for a caliphate 
and shari'a and their resistance to capitalism and democracy.          
 
Chapter five provides the conclusions of the study.        
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 CHAPTER TWO  
THE EMERGENCE OF HIZBUT TAHRIR INDONESIA 
 
 
 
  
Introduction 
The topic of Islamic radical movements in Indonesia - also referred as ‘Islamic 
fundamentalist’, ‘Islamist’, ‘militant’, and ‘hardliner’ - has won significant 
attention from scholars and observers. The mushrooming of such movements 
was apparent especially after the fall of Soeharto in 1998. The topic became 
even more interesting after the bombing attacks in a number of places in 
Indonesia from 2002 to 2005, which revealed the existence of an Islamist 
terrorist network in Southeast Asia called Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Various 
studies have been produced in response to the emergence of Islamic radical 
movements and terrorist groups. However, a lack of knowledge of the 
dynamics of Islamic movements in the region has resulted in 
misunderstandings and generalizations. 
 
In general, Islamic radical movements in Indonesia can be categorized into the 
local and the transnational. The first, local group has emerged as a response to 
political and social changes in Indonesian history, without the strict adoption of 
and having no global links with those of the Middle East. This category 
includes the Darul Islam movement in West Java, Aceh and South Sulawesi 
during the 1950s and several Islamist movements emerging in the post-
Soeharto reform era, such as MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia) and FPI 
(Front Pembela Islam). These groups were shaped wholly by Indonesian socio-
political contexts and have no exact reference in terms of ideology or 
organization to any particular movement in the Middle East. Their struggle is 
limited to the nation, though they share the global agenda of Islamism, namely 
the implementation of shari’a or the establishment of an Islamic state. 
Transnational Islamist groups, on the other hand, draw direct inspiration, ideas, 
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ideology, methods and networks from movements in other parts of the world as 
a result of globalization and human movement. In this respect, to borrow 
Mandaville’s words, their “primary modes of organization and activism 
transcend the territorial boundaries of nation states”.1 In the Indonesian 
context, this sort of movement includes Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, the Salafi 
group, Jemaah Tabligh, and Jemaah Tarbiyah. These movements all have their 
origins in the Middle East and South Asia.    
 
Focusing on Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, HTI, this chapter argues that its 
emergence and rapid development is inseparable from global and Indonesian 
socio-political contexts alike. Facing repression from the authoritarian state in 
Soeharto’s New Order era, HTI operated underground and focused on 
education through its halqa (study circles) and confined its activities to 
university campus mosques. However, after the fall of Soeharto, HTI emerged 
into Indonesian public view, utilizing the new democratic political sphere to 
advance its cause by conducting various rallies, producing media and hosting 
seminars and discussions, etc. in order to disseminate its ideas and to gain 
public support.  
 
The first part of this chapter deals with the origins and ideology of Hizbut 
Tahrir. The second part discusses the history of Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia and 
its general development from the New Order era to Post-New Order era and 
explores the socio-political contexts. The third part deals with the emergence 
and development of HTI in a local context by reference to HTI in South 
Sulawesi. 
 
 
Hizbut Tahrir: Origins and Ideology 
Hizbut Tahrir was founded in East Jerusalem in 1953 by the Palestinian Islamic 
legal scholar and political activist, Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani (1909-1977). An-
Nabhani was educated in law at al-Azhar University in Cairo, and later worked 
                                                 
1 Peter Mandaville, Global Political Islam, (London and New York: Routledge, 2007) 279.  
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as a religious teacher in high school, a chief clerk and then judge in the Islamic 
courts in Palestine.2 Some writers suggest that he was a sympathizer, if not a 
member, of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), an Islamist movement of Egyptian 
origin founded in 1928. It is likely that An-Nabhani interacted with the MB 
ideas during his study in Egypt, for the impact of MB influences can be seen in 
his political and religious thought, especially in the idea of the completeness of 
Islam and Islam as the solution for the umma in dealing with any problem, 
whether political, economic, social or cultural. Apart from this, An-Nabhani 
was also attracted by the ideals of the Syrian Ba'th party which upheld Arab 
nationalism and pan-Arabism, while basing his political views on Islam as the 
basic principle rather than the secular.3 An-Nabhani called Hizbut Tahrir an 
Islamic political ‘party’ rather than an Islamic organization, following the trend 
of emerging Arab political parties since the 1930s. In relation to this, Suha Taji 
Farouki regards An-Nabhani as “one of the first Arab intellectuals to argue the 
case for a modern political party using the constructs of Islamic discourse”.4
 
The establishment of HT appeared as a response by An-Nabhani to Western 
colonialism which had led to the fall of caliphate, the loss of Palestine and the 
separation of Arab-Muslim countries into a number of nation-states. His 
primary concern was therefore to unite the Arab-Muslim countries under a 
single caliphate.5 In many of his works, An-Nabhani shows a pre-occupation 
with liberating Muslim countries from the impact of Western imperialism. In 
his Mafahim Hizbut Tahrir (Understanding Hizbut Tahrir) he wrote: 
 
“…It (HT) stands against colonialism in all its forms and aims to 
liberate the umma from the colonialist intellectual leadership and to 
remove its cultural, political, military and economic influences from the 
Islamic lands. It also aims to change erroneous and distorted concepts 
                                                 
2 Suha Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic 
Caliphate (London: Grey Seal, 1996) 1-2. See also International Crisis Group, "Radical Islam 
in Central Asia: Responding to the Threat of Hizbut Tahrir", in ICG Asia Report no. 58, 30 
June (2003) 2. 
3 Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest, 4.  
4 Ibid., ix.  
5 Taji-Farouki, “Islamists and Threat of Jihad: Hizb al-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun on Israel and 
Jews”, in Middle Eastern Studies, 36: 4 (October 2000) 22. 
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spread by colonialism which restrict Islam to personal worship and 
morals”.6  
 
It is also worth noting that An-Nabhani’s reaction to the West is more radical 
than that of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian Hasan al-
Banna, since he made an absolute dichotomy between Islam and Western 
civilization, echoing the division put forward by the later leader of MB, Sayyid 
Qutb between Islam and the jahiliyyah (an ignorance of Islam). In this regard, 
An-Nabhani conceived of Islam as a ‘self-sufficient principle’, a 
‘comprehensive and thoroughly modern ideology’ and superior to other 
ideologies coming from the West, i.e. capitalism and socialism.7             
 
HT is a transnational Islamist movement with a distinctive political orientation. 
Differing from other Islamist groups, HT declares itself to be a political group, 
not an intellectual, spiritual or a social group.8 However, it does not engage in 
electoral politics, since it explicitly rejects democracy. HT views democracy as 
an ‘unbeliever system’ (sistem kufur) which is contrary to Islam. For HT, Islam 
only recognizes God as law maker, not human agency. Therefore, HT regards 
it haram (prohibited) for Muslims to adopt and propagate it.9 Opposing the 
separation between religion and state, HT views politics as any effort to care 
for and maintain the matters of society in accordance with Islamic law and the 
solutions of Islam.10 This is in line with the stated aim of HT, namely “to 
resume the Islamic way of life and to convey the call of Islam to the world.” 
This for HT means “bringing Muslims back to living an Islamic way of life in 
Dar al-Islam (the domain of Islam) and in an Islamic society in which all of 
life's affairs in society are administered according to the rules of shari’a, 
regarding what is halal (lawful) and haram (prohibited) under the protection of 
                                                 
6 Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani, Mafahim Hizbut Tahrir (Jakarta: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 2007) 
128. 
7 Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest, 37-45. 
8 Hizbut Tahrir, Mengenal Hizbut Tahrir: Partai Politik Islam Ideologis (Pustaka Thariqul 
Izzah, 2000) 1. 
9 Ibid., 59. For HT's radical rejection of democracy, see Abdul Qadim Zallum, Demokrasi: 
Haram Mengambilnya, Menerapkannya, dan Mempropagandakannya (Bogor: Pustaka 
Thariqul Izzah, 1994). 
10 Ibid., 23. 
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the Islamic state, which is the Khilafah, the Caliphal state”.11 Thus the 
restoration of the caliphate, in HT's view, is essential in order to achieve the 
glory of Islam.  
 
The re-establishment of the global caliphate is the major emphasis of HT's 
struggle, and due to its adherence to the ideal of khilafah, Peter Mandaville 
identifies HT as a khilafist group.12 In the view of An-Nabhani, the caliphate of 
the Ottoman Empire, abolished in 1924, was the only authentic form of Islamic 
government to have a historical and doctrinal basis. Its restoration was 
axiomatic to ensure the comprehensive implementation of shari'a. If an Islamic 
state under the rule of a caliph were re-established it would spread Islamic 
ideas and precepts all over the world, “restoring the umma to its golden age as 
dominant in the world and spearheading a mission to liberate the globe from 
the evils of capitalist hegemony”.13 An-Nabhani asserted that the appointment 
of a caliph is an obligation upon Muslims. Albeit that the form of Islamic 
government is a debatable issue among Muslim scholars, An-Nabhani 
interpreted the caliphate as an obligation confirmed by the Qur'an, Hadith and 
Consensus of the Companions (Ijma’).14 This is because numerous shari'a 
duties, such as the upholding of Islamic rules, the implementation of the penal 
code and guarding the frontiers of the state rely on the presence of a caliph. To 
advance his cause, An-Nabhani included in his book a detailed state 
constitution describing its political, social and economic systems, as well as 
educational and foreign policies.15
 
Hizbut Tahrir is radical in terms of its political ideas but emphasizes peaceful 
means to achieve its goal by emulating the Prophet's model of da’wa. HT is 
radical in so far as it favors fundamental political change through the 
replacement of the existing nation-states and the creation of a new Islamic state 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 20.  
12 Mandaville, Global Political Islam, 266. 
13 Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest, 77. 
14 Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani, Daulah Islam (Jakarta: HTI Press, 2007) 276. 
15 See the constitution in An-Nabhani, Peraturan Hidup dalam Islam (Jakarta: HTI Press, 
2008) 139-195. 
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under one central ruler.16 Differing from the Muslim Brotherhood, HT opposes 
gradualism (tadarruj) as it suggests a weakness and impracticality in Islam. 
Although HT claims itself to be anti-violent, the movement was involved in 
masterminding two attempted coups by sections of the armed forces of Jordan 
during 1968 and 1969.17 Moreover, there have been several arrests of HT 
members allegedly involved in violent actions in Central Asia. However, in the 
Indonesian case, no evidence has been found to suggest links to violence or 
terrorism. One should refer to HT's ideology to understand its activism and 
possible connection with any jihadi action. Referring to the experience of the 
creation of an Islamic state in the period of the Prophet Muhammad, HT has 
envisaged three stages of political struggle:           
 
1. The Stage of Culturing: “Finding and cultivating individuals who are 
convinced by the thought and method of the party. This is necessary in order to 
formulate and establish a group capable of carrying the party's ideas.” 
2. The Stage of Interaction with the Umma, in order to encourage the umma 
to embrace Islam, so that it works to establish Islam in life, state and society.” 
3. The Stage of Taking Over Government: “Establishing an Islamic state, 
implementing Islam generally and comprehensively and carrying its message 
to the world.”18  
 
 
These are the three steps of action to be used by HT to lead the umma to the 
establishment of an Islamic state. It is implied that the struggle should be 
started from below, using a bottom-up approach. It is therefore understandable 
why this transnational movement is very active in recruitment, culturing 
processes and spreading its ideas through media, pamphlets, seminars and 
rallies as part of undertaking the first and second stages. 
 
Since its inception, HT leaders and members have faced challenges and 
crackdowns and this has created a world diaspora of its members. An-Nabhani 
himself experienced harsh repression by the Jordanian government; he was 
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arrested on charges of subversion after submitting an application to register 
Hizbut Tahrir as a political organization.19 This led him to live into exile in 
Jerusalem, Syria and Lebanon while disseminating his ideas and building HT 
chapters. An-Nabhani passed away in Beirut in 1977 and was succeeded as 
supreme leader by Abdul Qadeem Zallum, which position was then occupied 
by Ata Abu Rashta in 2003.20 Like An-Nabhani, many of his followers have 
faced repression from the authorities of Middle Eastern countries which has 
forced many of them to flee to Western countries. Since the early 1990s, 
Hizbut Tahrir has expanded quickly into Central Asia, North Africa, Turkey, 
Europe and Southeast Asia.21 While Jordan probably serves as the central base, 
the UK has been regarded by many as the new HT headquarters and base of 
operations. HT itself has claimed to have branches (wilayah) in forty countries, 
making it a global movement with a strong world-wide network.                    
 
 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Beginnings, Socio-Political Context and 
Development 
 
Origins of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia 
The coming of HT to Indonesia is linked to the HT community in Australia in 
the early 1980s. Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi and Mama Abdullah Nuh were two 
figures who played an important role in the expansion of HT in Indonesia in its 
earliest development.22 Al-Baghdadi was an HT activist from Lebanon who 
had migrated to Australia in the early 1960s to escape persecution. It is 
reported that he had joined the armed struggle against Israel.23 The latter 
figure, Abdullah bin Nuh, was head of the pesantren (Islamic boarding school) 
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of Al-Ghazali in Bogor, West Java.  He was also a popular preacher and a 
Muslim scholar with expertise in Arabic literature, holding a chair in the 
Faculty of Arts, The University of Indonesia (UI) in Jakarta. His acquaintance 
with HT began while on a visit to his son, who was studying in Sydney. As 
Australia was one of destinations of HT migrants from the Middle East, it was 
among them that Abdullah bin Nuh met the charismatic young teacher, Al-
Baghdadi. Engaging in dialogue and intensive discussions with al-Baghdadi, 
Bin Nuh was impressed by his advanced knowledge of Islam at his young age. 
Abdullah Nuh invited Al-Baghdadi to visit Bogor in order to help him to 
develop his pesantren.24 It was from here then Al-Baghdadi began to 
disseminate the HT ideas in Indonesia.  
 
Al-Baghdadi arrived in Indonesia in 1982 and spread HT teachings through 
Abdullah bin Nuh’s pesantren. In this da'wa activity he interacted with Muslim 
student activists of the campus mosque Al-Ghifari of the Bogor Agricultural 
Institute (Institut Pertanian Bogor, IPB) and used the opportunity to introduce 
HT ideas to the students.25 Since many students were attracted to his da'wa, he 
and bin Nuh began organizing recruitment and systematic education through 
training and halqa, the study circles.26 IPB's mosque had become the base of 
HT recruitment in the earliest stage and this was later expanded into ‘secular’ 
campuses in Java and Jakarta, still later reaching beyond Java through the 
Campus Preaching Institute (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, LDK). However, Al-
Baghdadi and bin Nuh did not openly use the name of Hizbut Tahrir in their 
first da'wa because of the suspicion of the state towards expressions of political 
Islam in the early New Order era.  
    
Although HTI grew in strength since its arrival in the 1980s, it only emerged 
into public view in 2000 when it hosted the first International Caliphate 
Conference in Jakarta. HTI's emergence was in line with the proliferation of 
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Islamic radical groups after the end of the Soeharto regime in May 1998. The 
following discussion therefore will briefly delineate the dynamic development 
of HT from the New Order era to the post-New Order era. 
 
 
The Campus Da'wa Movement and HTI in New Order Era Indonesia 
The emergence of HTI should be seen in the broader context of the emergence 
of preaching movements on Indonesian campuses in the 1980s. This was part 
of an Islamic resurgence among the younger Muslim generation since the late 
1970s, marked by a growing number of young people attending the mosques, 
not only to pray but also to learn about and discuss Islam. Moreover, there 
were many Islamic activities organized by students at secular campuses and 
many female students, from senior high school to university, started to wear the 
veil (jilbab).27 In the 1980s in particular, various Islamic groups espousing a 
transnational ideology, known as harakah (the movement), began to take shape 
under the various campus Islamic preaching institutions (LDK) and the public 
mosques.28 In contrast to the larger established traditionalist and modernist 
streams, these groups lacked a social and cultural base within Indonesia and 
were more concerned with international issues. Because of their global 
orientation, one writer recently termed them ’global santri’.29  
 
The emergence of campus preaching movements and the attraction of Islam to 
young Muslim students was generated by multiple factors. Firstly, the rebirth 
of Islamic revivalism marked by the 1979 Iranian revolution had a profound 
impact on Islamic movements across the world, including those in Indonesia. 
The event opened the eyes of young Muslims in Indonesia and elsewhere to the 
possibility that Islam could serve as a counter to the Western ideologies which 
dominated the Muslim world. The influence of the revolution could be seen in 
the early 1980s when many female students began to wear a new kind of 
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Islamic clothing called jilbab, adopting its style from Iran.30 Translations of 
books of Iranian Shi’i radical thinkers such as Ali Shari’ati and Imam 
Khomeini became available.31 Indonesian Muslims, although Sunni in 
majority, viewed the Iranian revolution as a triumph of Islam, looking at its 
universal spirit, regardless of theological differences. This phenomenon also 
contributed to the appeal of the preaching movements in campuses.   
 
Secondly, the New Order state marginalized political Islam and suppressed 
student activism on the campuses. The relationship between Islam and the 
state, especially in the early 1980s, was antipathetic. The experience of Muslim 
rebellions in the 1950s, which had involved leaders of the Islamic party 
Masyumi, led Soeharto to consistently opposed any aspirations or expressions 
related to the idea of an Islamic state. The Soeharto government was inclined 
rather to support cultural Islam, championed by the public intellectual 
Nurcholish Madjid in the 1970s, with his famous slogan ”Islam Yes, Islamic 
Party No!”, while surpressing what Liddle calls ’scripturalist Islam’.32 In this 
respect, Soeharto appeared to emulate the old Dutch colonial policy by 
”emasculating political Islam while outwardly promoting its spritual health”.33 
This was reflected in Soeharto’s policies such as eliminating Islamic symbols 
from political activism, eliminating Islamic-based parties and forcing Muslim 
politicians away from the political arena. The de-politicisation of Islam reached 
its climax when Soeharto mandated that all Islamic parties combine to form the 
United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) in 1973. In 
addition, in 1983 Soeharto also regulated that all parties and associations had to 
accept Pancasila as their sole ideological foundation.34 This regulation affected 
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Islamic student organisations such HMI, PMII, IMM, PII, which were forced to 
change their stated ideological basis from Islam to Pancasila.35
 
While suppressing political Islam, the government also restricted student 
political activism. In 1977, for example, the Ministry of Education banned all 
student involvement in politics. This step was followed by the dissolution of 
Student Governments (Dewan Mahasiswa, Dema) in 1978.36 On 19 April 
1978, the Ministry of Education released the policy of Normalisation of 
Campuses (Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus, NKK) and on 17 May 1978 it 
released the concept of Coordinating Campus Board (Badan Koordinasi 
Kampus, BKK).37 This policy led the campus bureaucracy under the rectors 
and deans to control student activities on the campuses. As a result, students 
became inactive and no longer openly engaged with the social and political 
problems of the nation. According to Rosyad, “their ideal intellectual and 
spiritual dimensions disappeared”.38 Facing these restricted conditions, Muslim 
students attempted to find outlets through which they could express their ideas. 
It was at this point that the university mosques became the centre of student 
activities.39 Vatikiotis cites Jalaluddin Rakhmat as saying, “the mosque became 
a sanctuary for the expression of political dissatisfaction and frustration.”40 
This trend was particularly visible on the ITB campus.41 In the mosques, 
Muslim students could freely discuss and express their ideas about Islam and 
politics outside the control of the state.  
 
Thirdly, the emergence of Islamic movements in the early phase was facilitated 
by informal study clubs emulating the methods of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
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These informal study clubs were initially facilitated by ITB lecturer Imaduddin 
Abdul Rahim (known as Bang Imad) who was concerned with Islamic teaching 
for students. The role of the Indonesian Islamic Predication Council (Dewan 
Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII) was crucial in supporting intensive 
training courses in the campuses by providing preachers and funds.42 Bang 
Imad regularly held Islamic training activities which he called LMD (Latihan 
Manajemen Dakwah, Preaching Management Training) which later evolved 
into the LDK.43 LMD was a type of training in which students studied for 
about seven days without contact with the outside world. The students learned 
essential Islamic teachings, such as the sources of Islamic values, the Qur'an 
and Sunnah (Prophetic Tradition) and the Islamic faith (Aqidah Islam).44 
Attracted to this kind of training, students from various universities in 
Bandung, Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Medan and other areas came to the Salman 
Mosque of ITB. When these students returned to their home universities, they 
developed similar activities in their own universities.45 It was from these 
groups that the emergence of the Tarbiyah Movement, the Salafi group and 
Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia began.  
 
Given the repressive nature of the authoritarian state toward the expression of 
political Islam, the HTI movement operated clandestinely. To avoid suspicion 
from the security services, HTI figures did not use HT in their publication and 
training courses, yet disseminated the idea of the need for the total 
implementation of shari'a and a caliphate.46 According to Ismail Yusanto, the 
government at that time never succeeded in uncovering the existence of HT in 
Indonesia because its members kept a low profile in society.47 In the Soeharto 
period, HTI's attention was focused on cultivating membership through halqa 
and expanding their network among Muslim student activists in Indonesia. HTI 
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was in the culturing stage (tatsqif) of the three methods of da'wa. HTI operated 
as an underground organization led by Abdullah bin Nuh until his death in 
1987, later succeeded by Muhammad Al-Khaththath.48
 
Since its inception, HTI was developed through LDK, along with other Islamic 
movements. This was due to the fact that HT arrived in Indonesia together with 
the coming of other harakah such as the Tarbiyah movement, Jama'ah Tabligh, 
and the Salafi group.49 Initially, there was no separation between the 
movements; the cadre trainings were held together with the same subjects and 
tutors. However, from 1988 there was division among the movements due to 
sharpening ideological differences between them.50 HTI used the LDK 
network as a channel for recruitment. In fact, the idea of establishing the LDK 
network was pioneered by leaders of HTI.51 An LDK network on the IPB 
campus in Bogor called Badan Kerohanian Islam Mahasiswa (BKIM, Student 
Association for Islamic Propagation) served as an important site for the earliest 
recruitment and dissemination of HT ideas. BKIM activists attended public 
sermons delivered by Abdullah bin Nuh and later joined the Pondok Pesantren 
Al-Ghazali to learn from him and Al-Bahgdadi on a regular basis.52 Having 
dominated LDK in IPB Bogor, HTI activists then spread their wings by 
recruiting new members outside Bogor through the LDK network, such as 
LDK in the University of Padjajaran, Bandung, IKIP Malang, the University of 
Airlangga, Surabaya, the University of Hasanuddin, Makassar and the 
University of Gajah Mada, Yogyakarta.53 After its split from other movements 
in LDK in 1994, HTI began to arrange its da’wa activities for the public 
without using the name of Hizbut Tahrir, while maintaining its network in the 
campuses. In this respect, HTI activists created “undercover organizations and 
activities like seminars, weekly learning circles and the publication of books 
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and pamphlets”.54 However, all of the activities of HTI in this period were 
limited to the level of the dissemination of ideas and recruitment, without 
moving further into mobilizing action in the street.  
 
 
HTI in the Post-Authoritarian Regime: Towards Engaging with the Umma 
The fall of the Soeharto regime on 21 May 1998 paved the way for political 
relaxation and democratization in Indonesia. A newly expanded public sphere 
provided an opportunity for political Islam to emerge. While the growing trend 
of political Islam was evinced by the proliferation of Islamic parties, there also 
emerged a number of Muslim paramilitary groups and Islamic radical 
movements. According to Effendy, the birth of these groups was not an 
immediate response to Indonesian’s new democracy but rather more a reaction 
to the socio-religious and political situation in the period of transition, which 
for these groups did not reflect Muslim aspirations.55 This included the 
weakness of the state in dealing with socio-religious conflicts, in law 
enforcement of gambling and prostitution and the regulation of alcoholic 
beverages. All of the groups appeared to aspire for the implementation of 
shari'a as the alternative.  
 
While many radical Islamic groups had risen to public view in 1998, HTI 
emerged on May 2000, when it convened the international conference on the 
Islamic caliphate at the Tennis Indoor Stadium, Senayan, Jakarta. This was the 
first public activity conducted under the banner of Hizbut Tahrir, openly 
introducing its ideas, programs and leaders.56 The conference was attended by 
5,000 HTI supporters and attracted extensive media coverage. The speakers 
invited were HT leaders from local and overseas branches such as Dr. 
Muhammad Utsman and Muhammad al-Khaththath (Indonesia), Ismail al-
Wahwah (Australia) and Syarifuddin M. Zain (Malaysia).57 The main issue 
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discussed was the importance of reviving the Islamic caliphate as a response to 
Muslim problems. Since 2000, HTI's public development has been noticeable 
in terms of membership, media and operations. The movement has now moved 
from the level of education to the level of interaction with the umma.   
 
 
Organizing Rallies and Demonstrations 
The most striking visibility of HTI is its protest movement in the street, in the 
form of rallies and demonstrations. Indeed, since the early 2000s, HTI has 
appeared as the most active Islamist movement in Indonesia to express its 
aspirations and demands in the street. In most cases, the HTI rallies have been 
systematically organized, at both the national and provincial level in response 
to national and international issues alike. In 2002, for example, HTI mobilized 
an estimated 12,000 members to stage a long march in Jakarta from the 
National Monument to Senayan stadium, demanding the implementation of 
shari’a law through the re-insertion of the Jakarta Charter into the 
constitution.58 This was a domestic response to the annual session of the MPR 
(Parliament), then deliberating on this amendment to the 1945 Constitution. In 
relation to global issues, in 2003 HTI organized rallies in front of the embassies 
of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Syria, Tunisia, UK, the People’s Republic of 
China and France to protest against US involvement in Afghanistan.59 HTI also 
utilizes Islamic celebrations to hold rallies in big cities about similar issues. 
Recently, on 4 January 2009, while commemorating the Islamic New Year, 
HTI simultaneously conducted rallies in several big cities in Indonesia 
condemning the Israel’s aggression on Gaza. In most of its rallies, HTI puts 
forth messages of blame against the capitalist system and Western ideas as the 
source of the world’s problems and makes the call to Muslims to re-establish 
the caliphate as the only alternative. 
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 Organizing Public Seminars 
The intellectual activity of HTI finds its expression through seminars and 
publications. This is one strategy to disseminate HTI ideas and to win support 
from the educated segment of Indonesian society. Seminars are energetically 
convened at international, national, provincial or regional levels in response to 
global, national and local issues. Two international caliphate conferences, for 
instance, have been held in Jakarta in 2000 and 2007. The latter conference 
was attended by around 80,000 supporters and was considered to be the largest 
international HT conference in the world. More recently, since mid- 2008, HTI 
has regularly convened monthly seminars at the provincial and national level 
which they call ‘Halqa Islam dan Peradaban’ (Seminars on Islam and 
Civilization), addressing various current issues. On such occasions, HTI 
usually invites speakers from among intellectuals, Muslim scholars and 
representatives of government, with speakers from HTI itself. However, most 
of the speakers invited present an Islamist point of view or are sympathizers 
with HTI's views. Moreover, the issues raised and the discussions which follow 
tend to be directed to supporting the HTI agenda. In most of its seminars, HTI 
contacts media groups in order to raise its voice and profile within the 
Indonesian public sphere.   
                     
 
Creating Media 
The use of the media and publishing is another intellectual means by which 
HTI gets its messages out to a public audience. It also serves as a means of 
maintaining communication and unity of thought among the members. HTI 
media take the form of pamphlets, bulletins, magazines, tabloids, booklets, 
books, DVDs and websites. HTI has published a weekly pamphlet, Buletin al-
Islam (Bulletin of Islam) since 1994. However, its circulation was initially 
limited to HTI activists. Salim notes that the pamphlet became “their intra-
group communication channel”.60 It had been published under a disguised 
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identification until early 2000, when it began using the name of Syabab Hizbut 
Tahrir (Hizbut Tahrir Youth). Since then, the bulletin, which comprises a four-
page pamphlet, began to be distributed to the public through the mosques at the 
Friday prayers every week.61 Another important publication for HTI is al-
Wa'ie (Awareness, Consciousness) a monthly magazine with glossy covers, 
running to about 15,000 copies per edition.62 More recently, since late 2008, 
HTI began publishing a 32 page monthly tabloid of good quality called Media 
Umat (Media for the Muslim Community).  
 
Translations of HT books and accounts of HTI leaders, especially the founder, 
Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani, are also important. HTI publishers include al-Izzah in 
Bangil, East Java, Pustaka Thariqul Izzah and Mahabbah Cipta Insani in 
Bogor, West Java, and more recently, HTI Press in Jakarta. The latter publisher 
has been publishing specifically official and standard books of HTI 
(mutabannat) with updated revisions from the HT central board. The 
mutabannat books refer to the most salient works of An-Nabhani, which are 
used in halqa. It is important however to note that HTI books and magazines 
are not publicly sold in book stores; they have their own outlets, which 
suggests that the primary targeted consumers are HTI members themselves. 
Like branches of HT overseas, HTI also has its own website, dating from 2004 
(www.hizbut-tahrir.or.id) allowing members to follow up to date information 
on HTI activities. The website facilitates a mailing list, online HT books and 
weekly pamphlets which can be accessed freely.  
                              
 
HTI in South Sulawesi 
The emergence of HTI in South Sulawesi cannot be isolated from the role of 
the LDK network during the 1990s. Makassar, the capital city of South 
Sulawesi, has long been the destination of study for people in Eastern 
Indonesia, as it provides a range of universities such as University Hasanuddin 
(UNHAS), the State University of Makassar (UNM), the Alauddin State 
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Islamic University (UIN), The University of Indonesian Muslims (UMI) and 
the University of ‘45 (Universitas ‘45), to mention a few. As discussed above, 
university campuses provide the base for Islamic movements developed 
through LDK. In Makassar, UMI and UNHAS campuses established LDK in 
the early 1990s within LDK's network, a move initiated by LDK activists in 
West Java. However, in its earliest phase of development LDK was a loose 
institution which accommodated students from any stream of Islamic 
organizations. According to Hasanuddin Rasyid, it was the LDK activists of 
UMI campus who played a key role in bringing HTI ideas and developing HTI 
in Makassar.63 This was due to intensive interaction between LDK activists in 
UMI and those in Java, and Rasyid recalls that in the early 1990s he and his 
friends from UMI's LDK joined the Institute of Qur'anic Memorization 
(Lembaga Tahfidzul Qur'an), a campus Islamization program initiated by the 
rector of UMI, Prof. Dr. Abdurrahman Basalamah. As a part of the program, 
the students received the information from the LDK of IKIP in Malang, East 
Java that a month-long course in Arabic language was being offered. Interested 
in studying Islam and Arabic, 15 LDK activists, including Rasyid went to 
Malang to attend the course, during which they were introduced to the ideas of 
various Islamic movements, including those of Hizbut Tahrir.64 When 
returning to Makassar, they founded a forum on Islam in 1995, due to their 
interest in HT thought. They developed the discussion of HT ideas, such as 
Islamic faith (aqidah Islam), principles of shari’a, world ideologies, the system 
of government in Islam, Islamic economy, and so forth.65 This was the embryo 
for the emergence of HTI in Makassar and South Sulawesi. At first, HTI 
activists restricted participation in their discussion groups to students on the 
campuses. Then, realizing that HT's struggle is concerned with the 
establishment of an Islamic society and an Islamic state, the LDK activists 
began to propagate HT ideas outside the campuses. As noted by Badruzzaman, 
there were three pioneer activists in the establishment of the HTI branch in 
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Makassar: they were Ir. Hijrah Dahlan, Ir. Alimuddin, and Ir. Hasanuddin 
Rasyid.66   
 
The launching of a branch of HTI in Makassar was initiated by a seminar on 
the caliphate held at UNHAS campus in 2000. This followed the emergence of 
HTI into public view with its International Caliphate Conference in May 2000 
in Senayan Stadium, Jakarta.67 The HTI seminar in Makassar was attended by 
around 1,000 people, including students and various segments of society.68 The 
speakers in the seminar were the Prof. Dr. H. Abdurrahman Basalamah (Rector 
of UMI), Prof. Dr. Mattulada (historian of UNHAS) and Dr. Utsman (HTI 
activist from Surabaya).69 Since then, HTI has operated in public in Makassar, 
organizing various activities in order to disseminate its ideas and attract public 
support.  
 
As I have already established, from its emergence in Indonesia up to the 
present, HTI’s base of recruitment and education has been the university 
campuses, especially through the LDK and study clubs. As I observed on 
fieldwork in Makassar, each university campus has a branch, or what recently 
have been called ‘HTI chapters’. There are pamphlets displayed on campus 
information boards under the name of each HTI chapter or its study clubs 
under different names. It seems that HTI activists have dominated LDK 
campus activities in Makassar and therefore, as one HTI activist said, LDK 
tends to be synonymous with HTI in her campus, UMI.70 Moreover, there is a 
network of LDK called BKLDK (Badan Koordinasi Lembaga Dakwah 
Kampus, LDK Coordinating Board) which is dominated by HTI activists. LDK 
and the study clubs run by HTI usually host seminars and discussions of 
current issues as the first step in attracting students to join them. From there, 
the participants will be introduced to HT ideas and later be directed to become 
HTI members through set stages of education. Gerakan Mahasiswa 
                                                 
66 This activist now has become the spokesperson (Humas) of DPD 1 HTI in South Sulawesi.  
67 Hasanuddin Rasyid, Interview, 13 December 2008. 
68 Badruzzaman, “Gerakan Keagamaan ‘Hizbut Tahrir’ dan Lektur Rujukannya”, n.d. 
69 Hasanuddin Rasyid, Interview, 13 December 2008. 
70 Rahmawati, Interview, 9 January 2009. 
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Pembebasan (the Student Liberation Movement) is an HTI wing for expansion 
in the university campuses, dealing with political issues preferred by students. 
However, as several activists said, since late 2008 GEMA Pembebasan has 
been dissolved into an HTI chapter following a stipulation from DPP HTI in 
Jakarta, the board of the HTI chapter taking responsibility for expanding da'wa 
on campus.  
 
Besides LDK and the HTI chapter, Islamic study clubs also play an important 
role in recruitment. Each campus has its own name for such study clubs. The 
study club on the UNM campus, for instance, is called Fosdik al-Umdah 
(Forum Studi Islam Kontemporer ‘al-Umdah’, Contemporary Islamic Study 
Forum of Basic Issues), while at UMI campus it is called FOSIDI (Forum Studi 
Islam Ideologis, Islamic Ideological Study Forum). The activities of the forums 
comprise conducting discussions and seminars on contemporary politics and 
Islamic issues and producing bulletins and pamphlets which disseminate HT 
ideas to the students. Those who join the discussions in the forums and show 
interest in the issues canvassed will be targeted to participate in HTI training 
and further halqa.       
 
As a branch of HTI in Indonesia, South Sulawesi has committees at the 
provincial level called Dewan Pimpinan Daerah I (Provincial Executive 
Committee, DPD I) and at the district level, called DPD II and Dewan 
Pimpinan Cabang (Executive Committee for Sub-district, DPC) at the sub-
district level. The structure of DPD I consists of the head, spokesperson, and 
five departments which include: Lajnah Tsaqafiyyah (Department of Culture), 
Lajnah Siyasiyyah (Department of Politics), Lajnah Maslahiyyah (Department 
of Welfare), Lajnah Fa’aliyyah (Department of Administration) and Lajnah 
I’lamiyyah (Department of Information).71 The head of DPD I is Sabran, while 
the spokesperson (Public Relation, HUMAS DPD I) is Ir. Hasanuddin Rasyid, 
yet the latter’s position is more dominant in representing HTI in public and 
media coverage. This also applies for HT at the state and International levels. It 
                                                 
71 See Sukma, Hizbut Tahrir Daerah Sulawesi Selatan, Skripsi (Honour thesis) at the Faculty 
of Social and Political Science (Makassar: University of Hasanuddin, 2008).  
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is difficult for researchers to interview the head of DPD I and the chair of each 
department because the only channel for getting information is through the 
spokesperson, either at DPD I or DPD II. Rasyid stated that HTI has DPD II in 
almost all districts in South Sulawesi except the Christian based districts such 
as Tana Toraja and Toraja Utara.72 It appears that HTI in South Sulawesi has 
gradually expanded its foothold from the capital city Makassar to outlying 
districts and villages. Despite the growing membership of HTI in South 
Sulawesi, the number of its members is still a tiny compared to the Muslim 
majority of Indonesia. Based on my observation of a large rally conducted in 
Makassar, its size is around 5,000 to 10,000 actual members.  
 
Besides running intensive education programs for members, activists of HTI in 
South Sulawesi have orchestrated various activities in order to win the support 
of society at large. Their formal activities range from peaceful demonstrations 
or rallies on the street to intellectual activities, such as hosting seminars, 
discussions and workshops. Bulletin al-Islam, which is distributed by HTI 
activists on every Friday at many mosques in South Sulawesi, especially in 
Makassar, is the most important media to propagate their da’wa more broadly. 
The last page of the bulletin often contains information of HTI's coming 
activities, which openly invite people to attend. HTI of South Sulawesi even 
has organized the public prayers of two high holydays (Idul Fitri and Idul 
Adha) providing one of their members as the khatib, or preacher. They also 
cooperate with several local radio broadcasts in Makassar such as al-Ikhwan, 
Barata, Merkurius, Smart FM, and Suara Celebes to deliver Islamic sermons.73 
Moreover, many of the HTI student activists write their opinions and publish 
them in the local newspapers.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the origins, emergence and the dynamic 
development of one transnational Islamic movement in Indonesia. Exploring 
                                                 
72 Hasanuddin Rasyid, Interview, 13 December 2008. When organizing a big rally in Makassar, 
DPD I HTI always puts in contact persons for its members in several districts through 
pamphlets and billboards. I once found 14 of 20 districts have local contacts in pamphlets.    
73 Hasanuddin Rasyid, Interview, 6 January 2009. 
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Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, both in the political authoritarian and reform eras, it 
suggests that its emergence and development has been shaped by the shifting 
nature of the Indonesian state. The emergence of HTI together with other 
Islamist movements through Islamic study clubs (halqa) on tertiary campuses 
was related to Islamic resurgence in the late 1970s, spurred on by several 
factors: firstly, the global factor of the Iranian revolution of 1979, which 
inspired the revival of Islam as a social, political and cultural force in Muslim 
countries. Secondly, the authoritarian nature of the New Order regime as it 
took repressive measures towards political Islam and banned political student 
activities on the campuses. Students therefore found Islam to be an alternative, 
focusing their activities on campus mosques where they learned and discussed 
Islam through mental training and Islamic study circles.  
 
The religious activities were facilitated by Imaduddin Abdul Rahim who 
emulated the teaching method of the Muslim Brotherhood. It was against this 
backdrop that HT was introduced to Indonesia by Abdurrahman Al-Baghdadi, 
an HT activist who was invited by Abdullah bin Nuh to develop his Pesantren 
in Bogor. Interacting with Muslim student activists of LDK-IPB, they 
transferred HT ideas and organized halqa.  
 
HTI in the New Order era did not openly use its name, but rather operated 
underground, maintaining a low profile and focusing on recruitment and 
education as well as establishing a network of LDK across university campuses 
in Indonesia. After the fall of Soeharto, HTI emerged in 2000 with its 
International Caliphate Conference in Senayan Stadium, Jakarta. Since then, 
HTI has advanced its cause by establishing an HTI central board and 
expanding branches into several provinces, producing high quality media, 
organizing seminars and public discussions and conducting rallies in response 
to both national and international issues. Benefiting from the newly democratic 
political sphere, HTI has managed to win the support of ordinary Indonesian 
people by engaging with national and local issues in order to achieve its agenda 
of establishing shari'a and a global caliphate.  
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 CHAPTER THREE 
DA'WA AND RECRUITMENT 
 
 
Introduction 
While numerous studies of Islamic radical movements in post-New Order 
Indonesia have been written, only a few have dealt with the question of 
recruitment. Most studies are preoccupied with the resurgence of such 
movements by relating them to changes in the immediate socio-political context 
or wider global factors.1 However, socio-political and global factors alone 
cannot provide an explanation of why people join one particular movement and 
not others. In fact, each transnational Islamist movement has its own ideology 
and recruitment strategies which influence its appeal and the extent of its 
acceptance by Indonesian society. It is, therefore, important to undertake this 
case study on the particular Islamic movement, of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia in 
order to grasp the internal dynamics of recruitment and expansion. 
      
So in general, political, economic and socio-psychological analyses have been 
employed in order to comprehend the participation of Muslims in radical Islamic 
groups. These analyses were used to explain the rising phenomenon of Islamic 
revivalism in Muslim countries, especially in the Middle East in the 1970s and 
1980s. The failure of Muslim states in implementing modernization and 
development resulted in uneven development, rapid urbanization and spreading 
social alienation.2 As development was concentrated in the urban areas, many 
people from rural areas migrated to the cities seeking work and a better life. 
Facing hard lives in the cities and being shocked by “modern urban life and its 
Westernized culture” which diminished their traditional values and family ties, 
                                                 
1 See for example, Giora Eliraz, Islam in Indonesia: Modernism, Radicalism and the Middle 
East Dimension (Brighton and Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2004); Khamami Zada, Islam 
Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas-Ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002); 
Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni (eds.), Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 
2004); M Zaki Mubarak, Genealogi Islam Radikal di Indonesia (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2008). 
2 Valerie J. Hoffman, “Muslim Fundamentalists: Psychological Profiles”, in Martin E. Marty and 
R. Scott Appleby (eds.), Fundamentalisms Comprehended, Vol. 5 (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1995) 199-230. 
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the newly urbanized experienced individual alienation and a crisis of identity.3 
This situation led them to reassert their Islamic identity, in part by joining 
Islamic movements. Although analysis in this vein is important, it is limited to 
the interaction between the state, prevailing social conditions and the 
community and thus underplays the active role of Islamic movements in 
undertaking propagation and recruitment.  
 
Having researched HTI through participant observation and interviews with the 
rank-and-file members, I will argue in this chapter that to explain people's 
participation in HTI, we need to consider the active recruitment undertaken by 
the movement which is crucial in increasing its membership. It is important to 
do so for two reasons. Firstly, HTI is a global Islamic movement which places 
major emphasis on da’wa as its rationale in recruiting members. Secondly, the 
individual’s decision to join HTI is in part determined by the performance of the 
movement and its presentation of itself to the public. 
 
This chapter discusses the nature of HT as a global da’wa movement which calls 
upon young Muslims to join the organization. Drawing on the body of theory 
about new religious movements, it analyses the processes of conversion which 
draw recruits into becoming dedicated members. I will argue that individual 
persuasion through pre-existing interpersonal networks is essential in attracting 
people to join HTI. Moreover, socialization processes within new social 
networks established among HTI members serves to maintain their commitment. 
Based on the experiences of several hizbiyyin in Makassar, this chapter 
underlines several processes by which people are inducted into participation in 
HTI. 
 
The first part of this chapter discusses HTI's views on da’wa and its methods of 
preaching, which emulate the experience of the Prophet Muhammad as the 
                                                 
3 See John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992) 16. For a good account of the social-psychological bases of Islamic 
Revivalism in the Middle East see R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in 
the Arab World (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1985) 25-36. 
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doctrinal basis of recruitment. The second part examines HTI recruitment 
strategies as undertaken in Makassar, South Sulawesi, while the final section 
analyses three processes which are employed to draw individuals into 
participating in HTI. 
 
 
HTI as a Radical Da’wa Movement: Da’wa Methods and Recruitment 
The rapid expansion of Hizbut Tahrir in a number of parts of the world is due in 
no small part to its missionary activity. In this regard, HT, like other Islamist 
transnational movements, focuses not on converting non-Muslims to Islam but 
rather propagating its messages to Muslims all over the world and calling on 
them to support and participate in its agenda. Indeed, HT views itself as the 
representative of the umma and strives to shape Muslim mentality in order to 
revive the past glory of Islam. The recruitment strategy of HT is closely related 
to its ideology and its view of da’wa. Therefore, in order to understand the 
recruitment activities of HTI in Indonesia, one needs to comprehend HT's 
founding ideology and its views of da’wa. 
 
As already discussed in the previous chapter, Hizbut Tahrir views itself as a 
political party based on Islamic ideology and its major goal is to re-establish the 
caliphate and implement Islamic shari'a. Although the establishment of HT was 
An-Nabhani's response to the situation in the Middle East in the 1950s, many 
official HT books state that it was established as a response to one Qur'anic 
verse, Al-Imran: 104. “Be a community that calls for what is good, urges what is 
right, and forbids what is wrong: those who do this are the successful ones”.4 
HT interprets this verse as commanding Muslims to establish a community, or 
jama'ah in the form of a political party to undertake da’wa, or the calling of 
others to Islam. The rationale for this, in HT's view, is that da’wa activities are 
substantially concerned with politics, since an important element of da’wa is 
calling on the government to do what is right (amar ma’ruf) and to forbid what 
                                                 
4 Abdel Haleem, A New Translation of the Qur'an (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) 
42.   
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is wrong (nahy munkar) according to Islamic shari’a.5 HT aims to “revive 
Muslims from the existing decline, liberate them from kufur, or infidel ideas, 
systems of rule and laws, and liberate them from the domination of kufur 
states”.6  
 
In an attempt to revive the umma from its lamentable position, HT begins by 
analysing the factors which have led to its decline. It views the umma’s 
weakness as deriving from its failure to understand and implement Islam 
comprehensively. According to An-Nabhani, Islamic movements have failed to 
revive the umma for three reasons: first, there has been a lack of understanding 
of fikrah Islamiyyah (Islamic ideas) among Muslims; second, there has been no 
clear description of a tariqah Islamiyah (Islamic method) for carrying out the 
fikrah; and third, no effort has been undertaken to combine fikrah and tariqah as 
a solid and inseparable combination.7 In HT sources, fikrah refers to ideas solely 
derived from Islamic sources while tariqah refers to methods to realize Islamic 
ideals by referring to the Prophet's experience. In order to revive the umma, HT 
seeks to change the ideas and perceptions prevalent within the umma and to 
propagate what they see as the true understanding of Islam, which has clear 
fikrah and tariqah. In this way, HT activists are directed to carry out Islamic 
da'wa by transforming what they see as a ‘broken’ society into an Islamic one, 
so that Islam becomes the basis of public thinking.8   
 
According to An-Nabhani, HT’s da’wa methods are based on the historical 
example of the Prophet Muhammad when he was propagating Islam among the 
unbelievers of Mecca and Medina, that is, from secretive to open da’wa. HT 
points out that the current condition of Muslims is comparable to the historical 
condition of people in Mecca when the Prophet first began his da’wa among 
them. This is because, for HT, Muslims today are living in Darul Kufr, or the 
House of Unbelief, whose systems of law are not based on God's revelations. 
HT classifies the da'wah experiences of the Prophet into three stages:  
                                                 
5 Anonymous, Mengenal Hizbut Tahrir, 2-4.   
6 Ibid., 2. 
7 An-Nabhani, Mafahim Hizbut Tahrir, 6. 
8 Anonymous, Mengenal Hizbut Tahrir, 23. 
 42
   
1. The stage of culturing: “Finding and cultivating individuals who are 
convinced by the thought and method of the party. This is necessary in order to 
formulate and establish a group capable of carrying the party's ideas.” 
2. The stage of interaction with the umma: “in order to encourage the umma to 
embrace Islam, so that it works to establish Islam in life, state, and society.” 
3. The stage of taking over the government: “Establishing an Islamic state, 
implementing Islam generally and comprehensively, and carrying its message to 
the world.”9  
 
 
The last stage constitutes the final goal of HT, culminating in the establishment 
of an Islamic state. HT argues that this cannot be achieved without first passing 
through the previous stages: culturing and interaction. HT activists believe that 
da'wa is both an obligation and a major responsibility in life and that it should 
be balanced with other activities.10 This doctrine motivates HT members to 
carry out active recruitment. New recruits will be educated to adopt strictly 
(tabanni) and carry out fully the HT teachings. The education methods used in 
HT are quite different from those of the Muslim Brotherhood, the other best 
known rapidly expanding transnational movement. HT names its educating 
method tatsqif (culturing) to indicate that it is not only a matter of a transfer of 
knowledge (tarbiyah) but also a practical matter, in so far as HT educates its 
members to put into practice what they have learned in halqa in their everyday 
lives.11   
 
HT proceeds to the second stage only if it has recruited a significant number of 
members who have internalized HT ideology and can begin the struggle of the 
party. In the Indonesian case, HTI began the recruiting and culturing process in 
the early 1980s on state university campuses, moving into the second stage by 
appearing in full public view in 2000, when political conditions were relaxed 
after the fall of Soeharto in 1998. For HT, interaction with the umma does not 
mean to mobilise Muslims around them, but rather to educate and implant in 
                                                 
9  Hizb ut-Tahrir, The Methodology of Hizbut Tahrir for Change (London: Al-Khilafah 
Publications, 1999) 32. 
10 This is based on HTI members’ opinions.  
11 An-Nabhani, At-Takattul al-Hizbiy (1953), translated into Indonesian: Pembentukan Partai 
Politik Islam (Jakarta: HTI-Press, 2007) 52-53. 
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them the ideology of the party so that, once properly disseminated, it becomes 
the ideology of the umma.12 In undertaking education and da'wah within 
society, HT outlines several programs to be followed:13  
 
1. Thaqafah Murakkazah (Intensive Culturing). This is achieved through halqa 
for individuals who will in time become full HT members. By this intensive 
education, HT can build its cadres, shape their understanding of Islam based on 
HT ideology and prepare them to carry out da'wa.  
 
2. Thaqafah Jama’iyyah (Collective Culturing). This sort of education is 
addressed to Muslims collectively by propagating the ideas and Islamic laws 
adopted by HT. It is held through public religious studies (pengajian umum) and 
seminars in mosques and public places as well as through mass media, books 
and pamphlets in order to raise the consciousness of the umma.  
 
3.  Sira’ul Fikr (War of Ideas). This refers to activities for countering and 
challenging other ideologies, rules and thoughts perceived as ‘kufur’ or deviant. 
By means of this activity, HT seeks to oppose other ideas by undermining their 
arguments and exposing their weaknesses. 
 
4. Kifahus Siyasi (Political Struggle). The struggle takes two forms. First, by 
fighting against imperialist states which rule and dominate Muslim countries. 
HT maintains its position against any form of colonialism - by military, 
ideological, political or economic means. Second, by challenging rulers in the 
Arab and other Muslim countries, in the form of advice and criticism, when they 
ignore the aspirations of Muslims and deviate from the laws of Islam. Within 
this framework, HT also organizes activities to remove wrongful rules and to 
exchange them with a system based on Islamic law.  
 
5. Adopting the benefit (maslahat) for the umma based on Islamic law. This 
sort of activity means that HT guides people to gain maslahat in three ways: 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 63. 
13 Ibid., 35-37. 
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first, by correcting erroneous policies of the government; second, by offering 
Islamic solutions to the people; and third, by returning the people’s rights. In the 
Indonesian case, HTI has criticized the government's policy of increasing the 
price of fuel, of accepting foreign intervention in Indonesian affairs and of 
maintaining an expensive education system.14  
 
These programs underlie HT activities in every sphere, ranging from the 
intensive education of recruits to organising public rallies. The impetus for 
conducting da’wa and recruitment is regarded as an obligation upon members. 
Those who have undergone intensive halqa and show loyalty to HT will in turn 
become new agents of recruitment. The HT activities in every country seem to 
share these patterns. 
 
 
HTI Recruitment in Makassar 
The HT concept of da’wa presented above forms the religious rationale for 
programs of recruitment and mobilisation. Based on my observations and 
interviews, the recruitment strategies of HTI in Makassar strictly follow the HT 
ideology and methods and, to this extent, they show no significant difference 
from HT activities elsewhere in Indonesia or in other countries. Furthermore, 
HTI in the region focuses more on raising interest in national and global issues 
rather than local ones. Analysing the HT view of da’wa and its activities in the 
field, it is apparent that all activities conducted by HT should be put in the frame 
of calling people to join, or at least to give support, to their agenda. However, 
despite these various activities of HTI, individual persuasion through existing 
social networks is still the most effective way of attracting individuals to join 
HTI.  
 
 
                                                 
14  This program is not much elaborated in HT official literature. However, I found an 
explanation of it in the Al-Wa'ie Magazine. See MR Kurnia, “Tabanni Mashalih al-Ummah”, Al-
Wa'ie Magazine 54: Tahun V (February 2005) 43-46.    
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HTI trainings and seminars as a medium for recruitment 
Most of HTI’s recruitment takes place in the universities of Indonesia. The most 
important means of recruitment is by organizing training programs and seminars 
on the campuses. The HTI campus activists do not usually directly identify their 
activities as ‘Hizbut Tahrir’ but instead arrange events under the banner of LDK 
(Lembaga Da’wa Kampus, The Student Preaching Movement), Student 
Liberation Movement (Gerakan Mahasiswa Pembebasan) and disguised study 
clubs. This is in contrast with the formal committees of HTI such as of DPP, 
DPD I, DPD II, DPC and the HTI Chapter which openly use the HT name in 
organizing their activities. Some members refer to their undercover study clubs 
as ‘organisasi mantel’ or ‘mantle organisations’. This means that HTI activists 
deliberately disguise their recruitment wings on the campuses and HTI can be 
said to be using deception in its recruitment. This is a part of HTI’s strategy of 
‘soft recruitment’ through religious and intellectual means, so that students do 
not directly identify it as a radical Islamic movement seeking members.15 In this 
respect, whatever the medium, what is important for the HTI activists is how to 
deliver their message to students effectively and how to make them engage in 
HTI activities as the way of guiding them to becoming hizbiyyin.  
 
In Makassar there are various HTI study clubs on the campuses, such as LDK 
FOSDIK al-Umdah (Forum Studi Islam Kontemporer ‘al-Umdah’), 
Contemporary Islamic Study Forum of ‘al-Umdah’) at UNM, FOSIDI (Forum 
Studi Islam Ideologis, Ideological Islamic Study Forum) at UMI and Humaniora 
at UNHAS, to name a few. Targeting students, the study clubs actively organize 
discussions and distribute da’wa bulletins and pamphlets. In several campuses, I 
saw pamphlets of the study clubs hanging on student bulletin boards which 
contained information on HTI activities and messages calling on Muslims to 
denounce capitalism and return to the caliphate. With regard to training 
                                                 
15 The strategy of disguising the movement has been used by HT activists in Britain. According 
to the testimony of the former member of HT, Ed Husain, hizbiyyin in Britain disguise HT under 
the name of ‘the Muslim Unity Organization’ when undertaking local demonstrations in order to 
avoid media interest in exposing its homophobic and anti-Jewish statements. See Ed Husain, The 
Islamist: Why I joined radical Islam in Britain, what I saw inside and why I left (London: 
Penguin Books, 2007) 113.       
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activities, I found several pamphlets advertising ‘Liberation Training 1’ 
(Training Pembebasan 1) held on the UNM campus by the Student Liberation 
Movement of UNM, under the title of ‘Creating Alternative Students with 
Islamic Personality’. In other campuses such as UMI, the training is organized 
by LDK and aimed at targeting new students. The training usually consists of a 
group of ten to twenty people and lasts for two days, from morning to afternoon. 
On the surface, this looks like general Islamic training, but the materials 
discussed are those of Hizbut Tahrir. They include an introduction to the Islamic 
faith (aqidah), a basic understanding of shari’a and da’wa (mafahim syariah 
dan mafahim da'wah), comparative ideologies and an introduction to Hizbut 
Tahrir itself.16 Some informants acknowledged that they did not know that the 
training was held by HTI until they received material introducing HT. Students 
who show an interest in HT ideas will be invited to join intensive halqa. 
However, their initial participation in the halqa does not of itself make them full 
members. 
 
Caption: A pamphlet at UIN Alauddin Makassar advertising HTI training  
organized by the Student Liberation Movement of UNM  
 
   
It is interesting to note that some activists have already become acquainted with 
HT through a study of its texts in informal Islamic study clubs as early as senior 
                                                 
16 Interview with Hadijah, Makassar, 11 January 2008. 
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high school. These activists come from several districts outside of Makassar, 
such as Soppeng (South Sulawesi) and Ternate (Maluku), indicating that HTI 
has expanded its recruitment through its study clubs in senior high school not 
only in the capital cities but also in several districts in the province and in 
Eastern Indonesia. One of my informants, Ishak, recalled that in his school he 
had regularly attended HT Islamic study sessions (pengajian) four times a week 
and had read some of An-Nabhani's works. Therefore, when going to Makassar 
to pursue his studies he was already clear about which Islamic organization he 
wanted to join on campus. When taking part in the new halqa in Makassar he 
could begin at a more advanced level, studying further works of An-Nabhani 
with senior HTI members.17
 
The HTI of South Sulawesi (DPD I) utilizes public discussions as a medium of 
disseminating HT ideas to society at large. Within HT terminology, this program 
is called ‘public culturing’ (tatsqif jama’i). In contrast to the training held on the 
campuses, the public discussions do not aim to introduce the basic teachings of 
the movement. The public seminars usually deal with concrete, everyday issues, 
mostly contemporary politics, and HTI uses them as an opportunity to promote 
ideas based on HT ideology to the people and to gain sympathy and support 
from them. In order to attract audiences, HTI often raises issues aimed to 
connect with common aspirations. One of HTI activists explained the strategy of 
attracting people through public discussions: 
 
What we do is to unveil the facts of the damaging impact of capitalism 
by relating it to people's lives. When there are many housewives 
worried about finding oil and gas (elpiji), we tell them the fact that the 
scarcity of oil and gas is due to actors who control the government. 
They are the capitalists. We explain to the people the problems which 
lie at the root of the existing system. In the student context, for 
instance, we raise the current question of expensive education. We tell 
them why education becomes so expensive and who is to blame. 
Again, we explain the roots of the problem. In this way, we show them 
the facts that are close to them. When they become aware we invite 
them to join, and if they don’t, it is no problem for us.18    
                                                 
17 Interview with Ishak, Makassar, 10 January 2009. 
18 Interview with Hernawati, Makassar, 29 December 2008.   
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 The issues raised in the public seminars sometimes give the impression that HTI 
is concerned with the public good and supportive of the unity of the nation. I 
attended a national seminar entitled “Save the wealth of Eastern Indonesia, 
avoid disintegration and build a great nation with the khilafah”. At the beginning 
of the seminar, there was performance of traditional dances of Makassar, 
evidence that HTI uses local culture to advance its cause. Using power point 
presentations, the speakers explored the facts of the wealth of natural resources 
in Eastern Indonesia, such as in Sulawesi and Papua, and examined the causes of 
their massive exploitation which have led to unequal distribution among the 
people of Indonesia. The root of the problem, the speakers concluded, is the 
capitalist system, imposed by the West, which gives the opportunity to 
‘foreigners’ (bangsa asing) to exploit the resources and impoverish the 
Indonesian people. The answer to this situation, they proposed, is the restoration 
of the caliphal system. Such issues related to the public good are attractive to 
local people and many attend the HTI seminars. The local HTI often invite 
representatives of local government and various Islamic organizations to the 
seminars, either as speakers or as participants. This is a part of HTI strategy to 
gain support and sympathy from local government and the people in South 
Sulawesi. 
 
    
Caption: HTI's National Muslimah Seminar on 16 December 2008 in Makassar 
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The role of media is also important in HTI's da’wa and recruitment. HTI has 
utilized media ranging from books, booklets, magazines, bulletins, radios and 
pamphlets, to a website, yet during activities such as seminars and rallies, the 
media that they use in public audiences is Buletin Al-Islam. I once joined a rally 
of HTI Muslimah in Makassar and saw HTI activists handing out Buletin Al-
Islam and stickers to people they met in the street. This bulletin is regularly 
distributed at many mosques in Makassar at the Friday prayers. For adolescents, 
the local HTI of Makassar also produces special bulletins for distribution in 
senior high schools. Aside from spreading the HTI messages in society, the 
bulletins contain information of HTI's public activities in the city, providing 
opportunities for people to attend. In this regard, media enable people to be 
introduced to HTI messages and to come and participate in its activities. 
 
 
Recruitment Through Interpersonal Bonds  
A major part of the process of recruitment to HTI takes place through 
interpersonal relations between hizbiyyin and prospective members. Some 
insights into this process can be gained from studies of new religious 
movements in America in the 1960s. Several studies reveal that recruitment to 
religious cults and sects indeed occurs mainly through “pre-existing social 
networks and interpersonal bonds”. 19  To borrow Lorne L. Dawson's words, 
“friends recruit friends, family members recruit each other and neighbours 
recruit neighbours.”20 A study conducted on the followers of Sun Myung Moon 
(the 'Moonies') by John Lofland and Rodney Stark, for instance, have suggested 
that conversion is largely determined by the role of affective ties between the 
                                                 
19John Lofland and Rodney Stark, “Becoming a World-Saver: a Theory of Conversion to a 
Deviant Perspective, in American Sociological Review 30:6 (December 1965) 871-872; Rodney 
Stark and William Sims Bainbridge, “Networks of Faith: Interpersonal Bonds and Recruitment 
to Cults and Sects’, in The American Journal of Sociology 85: 6 (May, 1980) 1376-1395; 
Lawrence R. Iannacone, “Why Strict Churches Are Strong”, American Journal of Sociology 99: 
5 (March 1994) 1200-1201; Lorne L. Dawson, “Who Joins New Religious Movements and 
Why: Twenty Years of Research and What have We Learned?”, in Lorne L. Dawson (ed.), Cults 
and New Religious Movements: A Reader (USA, UK and Australia: Blackwell Publishing, 2003) 
119.  
20 Ibid. 
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group's members with potential recruits. 21  Lofland and Stark found that the 
conversion of people to a religious cult was not due so much to its ideological 
appeal as because they saw their friends and families in the group. Although 
some recruits may find a group problematic, their attachment with new friends 
and members can lead them to accept the ideas of the group.22  The similar 
finding on the importance of social networks in recruitment was confirmed by 
Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge who carried out quantitative 
research on three other sects: Doomsday, the Ananda Commune and the 
Mormons.23        
 
Like other religious cults and sects, most of HTI's recruitment takes place 
through individual persuasion and using pre-existing social networks. In fact, 
the invitation to people or students to attend HTI activities is very effective 
through personal contact. Most of my informants said that their initial 
participation in HTI training, public seminars and halqa was on their friends’, 
families’ or seniors' invitation. However, many did not know that the activities 
were run by Hizbut Tahrir. At this stage, the recruiters call on their friends and 
families to join the HTI trainings and discussions under the guise of learning 
about Islam (mengaji or belajar agama), or simply to enhance their existing 
knowledge of Islamic teachings. 
 
Hizbiyyin are active in finding new recruits, following the HT doctrine which 
states that carrying out da’wa is a life-time obligation for every Muslim. They 
view da’wa as a pivotal activity in their lives (poros hidup). Some members told 
me that every week, their supervisor asks about their da’wa activity, meaning 
the question of how many people they had approached that week. As most HTI 
members are students, they have to balance their time between academic study, 
following the halqa meetings, disseminating HT ideas and finding new recruits. 
Every HTI member is required to form a cell consisting of about five new 
members who will be educated under a supervisor called the mushrif (male) or 
                                                 
21 Lofland and Stark, “Becoming a World-Saver”, 871-872. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Stark and William Sims Bainbridge, “Networks of Faith”, 1376-1395. 
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the mushrifah (female). In halqa, recruits and members make an intensive study 
of key texts of Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani under the guidance of this supervisor. If 
a recruit has become a full member and fulfilled certain requirements, he or she 
will be asked to become a supervisor in turn. The formation of cells in HT is 
quite similar to that of Multi Level Marketing (MLM) or ‘pyramid-selling’ 
systems. Each member in a cell is required to find five new members and later 
he or she will educate them or find a senior member to be their supervisor. 
When these new recruits are inducted as formal members, again each of them 
will be assigned to find other new five members, and so on.  
 
The HTI activists are similar to evangelists in Christianity in seeking converts 
by building new social relationships.24 They are encouraged to be open and 
active in making acquaintances for recruitment. Once they find a new friend, 
they will keep in close contact and guide the person towards HTI activities. In 
building and maintaining social relationships, communication through mobile 
phones is useful to send on HTI information, da’wa messages and invitations to 
members and prospective members. One hizbiyyin recalled her experience of 
being contacted by phone by her senior at UNM inviting her to attend a religious 
study club, which she later realized to be a halqa of HTI.25 I myself, when 
making personal contact with HTI activists in Makassar, often received short 
messages from anonymous hizbiyyin containing information of the coming HTI 
activities, the critical response of HTI to national and global political events and 
da’wa messages such as the call to leave capitalism and democracy and the need 
to return to shari’a and the caliphate. Likewise, a friend of mine who helped me 
to gain access to hizbiyyin complained to me about their persistent approaches to 
her with short da’wa messages. If someone expresses an interest in HTI ideas, 
the activist will cultivate a closer relationship with the person in a bid to recruit 
them to higher level activities. One of my informants said that the first time after 
attending a discussion she was not so sure about joining HTI, but she was 
                                                 
24 For a good account of various methods of recruitment of ‘the New Evangelists’, see Peter 
Clarke (ed.), The New Evangelists: Recruitment Methods and Aims of New Religious Movements 
(London: Ethnographica, 1987).  
25 Interview with Khairunnisa, Makassar, 29 December 2008.  
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impressed by the fact that HTI activists seemed attentive and caring and 
continued to approach her until she joined.26 In persuading prospective members 
to join, the HTI activists, however, do not try to engage them on spiritual 
matters but try to focus on intellectual and emotional topics, especially by 
emphasising utopian promises. For instance, they present information on the 
‘Muslim decline’ and the ‘Indonesian crisis’, blaming Western capitalism and 
arguing that Islam, through shari’a and the caliphate, is the only solution for 
both regaining the glory of Islam and creating a better world. Those who are 
convinced by such HTI arguments are likely to join the movement. My 
interaction with HTI members suggests that they use current political and 
economic events, whether local, national or international, to drive home their 
arguments about the predatory Western capitalist system. Each member is urged 
to follow current developments carefully in order to back up or illustrate the 
broader ideological persuasion.  
 
The Joining Process in HTI 
Having discussed the recruitment strategy of HTI in Makassar, this section deals 
with the processes through which new recruits must pass. While recruitment 
involves all the approaches made by HTI in persuading people to engage in 
activities such as training and seminars, the joining process in this section is 
concerned with a socio-psychological interpretation of the conversion, from 
initial interaction with HTI ideas to induction as full members. Participation in 
HTI activities does not automatically lead to recruits becoming members. Those 
who want membership have to follow a formal process. For my analysis, I 
borrow from the sociological model of conversion advanced by John Lofland 
and Rodney Stark27, as well as the writings of Quintan Wiktorowicz on joining 
radical Islamic movements.28 The former model was the result of an influential 
study of early American followers of Sun Myung Moon. Lofland and Stark 
summarize that for conversion to a cult a person must: 
                                                 
26 Interview with Farah, Makassar, 23 December 2008. 
27 Lofland and Stark, “Becoming a World-Saver”, 862-875. 
28 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam”, available at 
<http://www.yale.edu/polisci/info/conferences/Islamic%20Radicalism/papers/wiktorowicz-
paper.pdf> accessed 7 February 2009. 
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“1) experience enduring, acutely felt tensions, 2) within a religious 
problem-solving perspective, 3) which leads him to define himself as a 
religious seeker, 4) encountering the D.P. (cult) at a turning point in his 
life, 5) wherein an affective bond is formed (or pre-exists) with one or 
more converts, 6) where extra-cult attachments are absent or neutralized, 
7) and where, if he is to become a deployable agent, he is exposed to 
intensive interaction.”29     
 
Wiktorowicz studied the radical Islamic group Al-Muhajiroun in Britain, while 
also drawing on some aspects of Lofland and Stark's work. He identifies four 
key processes which draw people to a radical Islamic group: 1) cognitive 
opening, 2) religious seeking, 3) frame alignment and 4) socialization.30 My 
research confirms these findings that ‘socialization’ or what Lofland and Stark 
call an ‘affective bond’ and ‘intensive interaction’ is essential in drawing people 
in to join and become committed to HTI. Considering the different 
characteristics of religious movements, there are, however, stages which do not 
apply to HTI. Borrowing from both models, I underline three processes which 
lead people to become HTI members: cognitive opening, religious seeking, and 
socialization.  
 
 
Cognitive Opening 
Cognitive opening refers to situations which lead an individual to be “receptive 
to the possibility of alternative views and perspectives”.31 According to 
Wiktorowicz cognitive opening could result from a crisis which weakens the 
individual’s certainty in the old beliefs.32 ‘Crisis’ in this regard is associated 
with tension, strain, frustration, deprivation and grievance generated by political, 
social or economic situations. The young Muslim immigrants in Britain, for 
instance, are prone to join global Islamic movements as an outlet for their 
frustration over the racial discrimination they have experienced. Lofland and 
                                                 
29 Lofland and Stark, “Becoming a World-Saver”, 874. 
30 Wiktorowicz, “Joining the Cause”. 
31 Ibid., 7. 
32 Ibid. 
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Stark emphasize the ‘stage of tension’ as the first process in their conversion 
model and it serves as the facilitating factor.  
 
From my interaction with HTI members in Makassar I gained the impression 
that many of them did not experience a crisis before joining HTI. Rather, it was 
the movement which propounded a sense of crisis in them. In this regard, the 
religious movement fosters cognitive opening through ‘outreach activism’, 
which means that activists “use current social networks or make new 
acquaintances to germinate a sense of crisis among contacts through discussions 
and subtle interactions”.33 This appears to be precisely the case for the most part 
with HTI members in Makassar. As part of the recruitment strategy, HTI 
activists actively amplify a sense of crisis among their acquaintances in existing 
social networks, new contacts and audiences, then emphasize that a return to 
religion is the best response.  
 
HTI activists usually undertake ‘framing’ or construction, by developing “a new 
diagnosis and remedy for existing forms of suffering” in order to generate a 
sense of grievance toward injustice.34 For instance, HTI stresses the ‘multi-
dimensional crisis’ and problems in Indonesia and the Muslim world and 
attributes these problems to the dominance of the secular capitalist system and 
the absence of a protecting caliphate. Whatever the issue raised, at the end of the 
discussion, Islam will be cast as the all-encompassing solution. At a monthly 
HTI seminar in Makassar, called ‘Halqah Peradaban’ (Halqah of Civilization) 
the spokesperson of HTI DPD I, Hasanuddin Rasyid, read an HTI official 
statement on ‘reflections on the end of 2008’ which outlined the crises faced by 
Indonesia during 2008 in the spheres of economy, politics, society and religion. 
He concluded: 
 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 8. 
34) Barrington More, Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt (N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 
1978) 88. Quoted in Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action 
and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 122-123.  
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Examining the problems which have emerged in 2008, it can be 
concluded that there are two main causes, i.e. the system and human 
factors. The crises of global finance, dismissals (PHK), unemployment, 
poverty, criminality and other social problems, foreign intervention, 
Islamo-phobia and all other forms of tyranny (kezaliman) have been 
happening due to human choice in managing aspects of life. The leader 
with no integrity (amanah), a bad system (i.e. capitalism and secularism) 
and the decline of morality have become the root causes of the 
aforementioned problems. Therefore, if we really want to be freed from 
the problems above, we have to choose a better system and an integrated 
leadership. The better system comes only from God, namely Islamic 
shari’a, and the integrated leader is one who submits to the better 
system.35  
 
        
Recruits new to HTI recorded various impressions of their initial interaction 
with HTI ideas. Some members recalled that when attending HTI seminars they 
were fascinated by the HTI speakers who presented deep, assertive and logical 
explanations of politics and Islam, using contemporary facts to support their 
arguments. Some other members, who had previously joined the Tarbiyah 
Movement expressed their interest in moving to HTI because of its ideological 
component (Islam as ideology) after attending HTI training sessions. They also 
felt that HTI's religious teaching was more comprehensive than that of the 
Tarbiyah Movement. The HTI frames are not only appealing to prospective 
members but also make good sense to them. This in turn leads people to want to 
know more about the religious ideas of the organisation and finally guides them 
to join it in a full capacity. 
 
Religious Seeking 
The self-presentation of HTI as an alternative movement which promises 
Islamic remedies for current problems provides the explanation for prospective 
recruits, especially university students, that religion not only relates to ritual and 
spiritual things but can solve socio-political problems as well. In various ways, 
HTI activists try to convince their recruits through discussion and debate that 
                                                 
35 Kantor Juru Bicara HTI, Refleksi Akhir Tahun 2008 Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia; Selamatkan 
Indonesia dengan Syariah – Menuju Indonesia Lebih Baik, Leaflet No. 147/PU/E/12/08, Jakarta, 
18 December 2008. 
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Muslims can regain their greatness and dominate the world as long as they 
return to the ‘true’ understanding of Islam, namely Islam which has genuine 
fikrah and tariqah. Given this new insight, the recruits have it confirmed in their 
minds that religion is of a practical importance to their lives. Therefore, those 
who are persuaded will regard HTI as a true representative among Islamic 
movements and tend to see local religious organisations such as Nahdlatul 
Ulama and Muhammadiyah, as well as the Muslim student organizations such as 
HMI and PMII, as inadequate in overcoming the problems of the umma. In this 
process, as Lofland and Stark noted, the recruits come to define themselves as 
religious seekers, namely persons “searching for some satisfactory system of 
religious meanings to interpret and resolve their discontent”.36 In HTI, this 
process will then lead on naturally into the process of socialization through 
intensive education and interaction with the members. 
 
The tendency towards religious seeking among prospective members is not 
always linked with previously strong religious backgrounds, as noted by Lofland 
and Stark. In fact, most HTI members I have met come from non-santri families 
and secular educational backgrounds; only a few have come through pesantren, 
or Islamic senior high schools. Most are university students from the fields of 
science and engineering or young professionals. HTI DPD I leaders such as 
Hasanuddin Rasyid, the Spokesperson and Asriani, the Chair of Muslimah have 
degrees in engineering from UMI. It seems that the recruits from non-arts and 
non-social science backgrounds are the most active in seeking meaning through 
radical Islamic movements. These potential members were persuaded and 
guided by HTI to ‘shop around’ for their religious ideas. Some of them did in 
fact make comparisons and experimentation by participating in various 
movements before finally deciding on their commitment to HTI.           
 
Socialization 
‘Socialization’ is a critical process which determines the membership and 
commitment of individuals to a movement. It provides a conducive environment 
                                                 
36 Lofland and Stark, “Becoming a World-Saver”, 868. 
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for them to experience a movement’s ideology and tenets through intensive 
education, interaction among members and participation in the movement’s 
activities. The socialization process, as Wiktorowicz noted, “is intended to alter 
the values of the individual so that self-interest is defined in accordance with the 
goals and beliefs of the movement’s ideology”.37 Moreover, the movement 
constructs a new identity for recruits and tightens new social bonds among them 
so that they keep learning and continue to be dedicated to the movement.38 If the 
recruits pass this process in HTI, they will become full members and new agents 
of da’wa. 
  
Once exposed to HTI's radical ideas and frames and becoming, in effect, 
‘religious seekers’, individuals will be guided to join the halqa. Halqa is an 
intensive type of education, taking the form of a weekly study club comprising 
five members under a supervisor. It serves as the most important medium of 
indoctrination for the recruits, in which they are taught to learn and internalize 
the ideology of HT as presented in the works of An-Nabhani. The venue for 
halqa depends on the members’ choice, but is usually in a mosque, a public 
space on campus or in one of the members’ houses. Beside their participation in 
halqa, the recruits are invited to engage in HTI activities such as 
demonstrations, rallies, seminars and so forth. However, it should be noted that 
their initial participation in such activities does not guarantee formal 
membership of the movement. Before being inducted as members, recruits have 
to complete the study of at least three books by An-Nabhani and demonstrate 
unswerving loyalty to HTI. The three books include Nizam al-Islam (Peraturan 
Hidup dalam Islam, the System of Islam), at-Takattul al-Hizbiy (Pembentukan 
Partai Politik Islam, the Party Structure), and Mafahim Hizbut Tahrir 
(Pemahaman Hizbut Tahrir, the Concepts of Hizbut Tahrir). Although they deal 
with theological and political discussions and use many Arabic terms, they are 
not too sophisticated to understand. However, HT requires its members to study 
them, paragraph by paragraph, under the guidance of a supervisor in order to 
avoid different understandings of HT ideology arising. Recruits can take two to 
                                                 
37 Wiktorowicz, “Joining the Cause”, 3. 
38 Ibid. 
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five years to become full members, depending on their zeal in attending halqa 
and their capacities of comprehension. In this process, recruits who have 
completed studying the basic books of An-Nabhani and show dedication and a 
willingness to sacrifice other aspects of their lives for HTI will be asked whether 
to they want to ‘continue studying’. Those who wish to continue will be sworn 
in through a special oath (qasm) while those who do not go on will become 
sympathizers of the movement.39  
 
Interaction with other members helps the recruits to develop social ties and 
strengthens their commitment to HTI. While halqa serves as the main focus for 
maintaining ideological awareness and conformity among members, intensive 
interaction helps to tighten their solidarity and deepen their understanding and 
commitment to HTI in the practical aspects of their lives. So halqa serves as a 
control mechanism among the members, especially between a supervisor and his 
or her cell’s members. The supervisor is responsible for making sure that his or 
her members, in both thought and behavior, are in accord with HTI ideology. In 
this way, self-discipline and self-awareness are implanted among members. If a 
recruit is seen by others breaking HTI rules, such as failing to perform the 
obligatory prayers or fraternizing with people of the opposite sex who are not 
relatives, then they will be warned and could possibly be dismissed from the 
organization. In spite of this mutual control, most members I interviewed felt 
under no pressure in so far as they believe it is the responsibility of every 
Muslim to advise and warn every other of the danger of possible sinful acts. 
Besides, they view this system of mutual support and control as something that 
is good for them as individuals. Strong solidarity among members then helps to 
keep them in HTI. The socialization process will in the end lead individuals to 
experience a transformation in their lives and become full converts, as well as 
new agents of HTI.         
 
 
 
                                                 
39 This information is based on interviews with several hizbiyyin. 
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 Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted the important role which recruitment plays in HTI. 
It has discussed the relationship between HTI da’wa doctrines, recruitment 
strategy and the joining process of HTI members in Makassar. It concludes that 
HTI's activities in recruitment are strongly related to its concept of da’wa, 
namely the progression from individual to public da’wa, emulating the 
experience of the Prophet in Mecca and Medina. Through da’wa, HT intends to 
spread its perceived ‘true’ understanding of Islam, an Islam which has clear 
fikrah and tariqah, in order to restore its glory. HTI conducts various activities 
ranging from the intensive education of the halqa sessions to public activities 
such seminars, rallies and long marches. Although the public activities and 
messages of HTI may have wide appeal to people at large, this chapter argues 
that interpersonal bonds through the pre-existing social networks – such as 
student groups on the university campuses – are more essential. These new 
social networks established among HTI members lead on to further commitment 
to the movement. 
  
Borrowing from analyses by Lofland and Stark and Wiktorowicz, the chapter 
has demonstrated three processes in conversion to HTI: cognitive opening, 
religious seeking and socialization. First, individuals are exposed to HTI 
messages which are appealing and make sense to them. HTI magnifies a sense 
of the crisis and decline which beset Indonesia and the wider Muslim world and 
calls people to return to Islam through shari’a and the caliphate. Second, in 
response to these radical messages, individuals become attracted to learn more 
about Islam. They move into a socialization process by joining halqa and 
various activities of HTI as well as interacting with HTI members. Some 
prospective members might make their own comparisons and experimentation at 
this stage. Third, intensive education and interaction among members lead the 
recruits to accept, understand and internalize the HT ideology. Eventually, 
prospective members who have completed their study of basic books of An-
Nabhani, proved their dedication and made sacrifices of time and effort will be 
offered full membership of HTI. 
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 CHAPTER FOUR 
INDOCTRINATING HIZBIYYIN: 
SEEKING CERTAINTY THROUGH AN-NABHANISM 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In Indonesian today, it is no longer an unusual public scene to see long lines of 
hizbiyyin marching along major roads, demanding the restoration of the 
caliphate and denouncing world capitalism and western democracy. Walking 
several kilometers at a time, HTI activists enthusiastically raise and swing the 
distinctive black and white Hizbut Tahrir flags (liwa’ and raya) while shouting 
the takbir of ‘Allahu Akbar’ (‘God is Most Great’). While some activists hold 
the banners, others are busy distributing leaflets and stickers to people at the 
side of the roads. Revolutionary Islamic jargon colours the HTI rhetoric. The 
hizbiyyin seem sincere and dedicated in carrying out their da’wa for awakening 
the umma. Moreover, they appear confident and eloquent when talking about the 
crisis of capitalism and the urgent need to adopt Islam as the solution. The scene 
raises the question for us of why these young Muslims are so critical of Western 
concepts and so enthusiastic in joining rallies and demonstrations. Indeed, what 
makes hizbiyyin become so committed and dedicated to the HTI movement? 
  
The discussion of commitment and dedication to a radical movement cannot be 
isolated from an examination of the indoctrination process which enables 
members to grasp and internalize its ideology and tenets. To date, there has been 
no study of indoctrination by scholars of transnational Islamist movements, 
especially of those in Indonesia. HTI provides an interesting case in which the 
members the show strong influence of indoctrination in their thought and 
behavior. In this chapter I suggest that intensive indoctrination in HTI is crucial 
in shaping the thinking of hizbiyyin and serves to maintain ideological 
uniformity and commitment to the movement. 
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The term ‘indoctrination’ sounds pejorative to many, as it tends to be associated 
with terms such as brainwashing, deprogramming, mind manipulation and mind 
control through coercion. The negative associations of the term are due to the 
development of the democratic notion in education which regards indoctrination 
as a coercive educational method of totalitarian regimes.1 In this chapter, 
however, I use indoctrination as a neutral concept which refers to a classical 
method of teaching. To follow the definition by William Heard Kilpatrick, 
indoctrination refers to “the implanting of doctrines which are to be held 
uncritically.”2 The doctrines in this regard are commonly related to political, 
moral and religious beliefs.3 As I will show, indoctrination in HTI does not 
involve coercion, yet it guides people to understand and internalize Islam under 
the closed system of interpretation of its founder, Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani. The 
indoctrination process in HTI is conducted through intensive halqa and 
socialization which aim to maintain ideological cohesion among the members. 
While recruitment serves to attract people to join, indoctrination is essential to 
produce dedicated hizbiyyin. Through intensive halqa, young Muslims can find 
certainty and a new identity, as well as maintaining their dedication to the 
movement.  
 
The first part of this chapter analyses the process and method of indoctrination 
through halqa in HTI. The next part deals with young members of HTI and their 
susceptibility to HT ideology and doctrines. The last part analyses the 
commonly repeated narratives of hizbiyyin and their relation to the effects of 
indoctrination.  
 
 
Indoctrinating An-Nabhanism Through Halqa 
In various printed works of Hizbut Tahrir, it is always emphasized that Islam is 
the ideology of the party which is superior to all other ideologies. Islam, in HT's 
                                                 
1 I. A. Snook, Indoctrination and Education (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1972), 17. 
2 Snook (ed.), Concepts of Indoctrination: Philosophical Essays (London and Boston: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1972), 4. 
3 Richard H. Gatchel, “The Evolution of the Concept” in Ibid., 19. 
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perspective, however, refers to the interpretations of Islam provided by its 
founder, Taqiuddin An-Nabhani. Due to this strict adherence to An-Nabhani's 
thoughts, I call HT’s ideology ‘An-Nabhanism’. Conceiving of itself as a 
political party, HT intends that individuals embrace the ideological platform of 
the party and carry out its programs. One of HT's methods in guarding 
ideological uniformity among the hizbiyyin is the process of adopting canonical 
ideas (tabanni).4 HT has both an ‘adopted canon’ (thaqafa mutabannah) and an 
‘un-adopted canon’ (thaqafa ghayr mutabannah).5 According to Taji-Farouki, 
the former canon consists of texts addressed to the party and its members in 
order to direct their conduct, while the latter canon is addressed both to HT and 
Muslims in general. It is obligatory for each member to embrace the former and 
deviation from it could lead to disciplinary measures.6 Both canons contain 
selected ideas, opinions and laws related to various aspects which are believed 
to be wholly derived from Islam. The works include: 
 
1. Nizamul Islam (The System of Islam) 
2. Nizamul Hukmi fil Islam (The Ruling System of Islam) 
3. Nizamul Iqtisadi fil Islam (The Economic System of Islam) 
4. Nizamul Ijtima'iy fil Islam (The Social System of Islam) 
5. At-Takattul al-Hizbiy (The Party Structure) 
6. Mafahim Hizbut Tahrir (The Concepts of Hizbut Tahrir) 
7. Daulatul Islamiyah (The Islamic State) 
8. Syakhsiyah Islamiyah (The Islamic Personality), in 3 volumes  
9. Mafahim Siyasiyah li Hizbit Tahrir (The Political Concepts of HT) 
10. Nadharat Siyasiyah li Hizbit Tahrir (The Political Views of Hizbut Tahrir) 
11. Muqaddimah ad-Dustur (Introduction to the Constitution) 
12. Al-Khilafah (The Caliphate) 
13. Kaifa Hudimatil Khilafah (How the Caliphate was Destroyed) 
14. Nizamul ‘Uqubat (The Penal Code) 
15. Ahkamul Bayyinat (The Rules of Evidence) 
16. Naqdul Ishtirakiyat al-Marksiyah (Refutation of Marxist Communism) 
17. At-Tafkir (Thought) 
18. Sur’atul Badiihah (Presence of Mind) 
19. Al-Fikrul Islamiy (Islamic Thought) 
20. Naqdu Nazariyatil Iltizami fil Qawanini al-Garbiyah (Refutation of the 
Theory of Liability in Western Law)  
21. Nida Har (A Warm Call) 
22. Siyasatul Iqtisadiyatul Mutsla (The Ideal Economic Policy) 
                                                 
4 Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest, 135. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Anonymous, Mengenal Hizbut Tahrir, 12-13.   
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23. Amwal fi Daulat al-Khilafah (The Treasury in the Caliphal State)7     
 
HTI literature does not specifically divide the books according to each canon. 
However, some members cited examples of the ‘adopted canon’ as Nizamul 
Islam, At-Takattul al-Hizbiy, Mafahim Hizbut Tahrir and Daulatul Islamiyah, 
while the ‘unadopted canon’ included Nizamul Iqtisadi fil Islam, Al-Fikrul 
Islamiy and Nizamul ‘Uqubat. The books appear as curriculum for new recruits, 
or daris and hizbiyyin proper and each member, whether junior or senior, is 
required to join a weekly halqa in order to study the listed works. Absence from 
the halqa meeting without good reason could lead to dismissal from HTI.  
 
 
Halqa and the Indoctrination Process 
Thus the halqa, or study-circle plays the most important role as the medium of 
indoctrination in HT. Farouki desribes it as “a small unit of party members and 
new recruits formed for the intensive study of the party ideology under the 
supervision of an experienced member”.8 Meetings consist of five individuals 
gathering around a supervisor and usually last for two hours per session. 
Membership to HT is conditional upon the candidate’s participation in intensive 
halqa. HTI members call this education through halqa the ‘culturing process’ 
(tathqif) to distinguish it from that of schools and universities. This is because 
the halqa regimen for HTI aims not only to educate members but also to 
develop what they have learned into their everyday behaviour. In this regard, 
halqa serves to inculcate HT ideology to the new recruits and members both in 
mind and in their everyday behaviour.  
 
The HT supervisor, mushrif (m.) or mushrifah (f.) has the important duty of 
maintaining the members’ understanding in accordance with the approved HT 
interpretations. Instead of encouraging critical thinking among members, the 
supervisor, acting as the mouthpiece of An-Nabhanism, directs them to follow 
his or her perspectives. 
                                                 
7 Anonymous, Mengenal Hizbut Tahrir 2, 27-29. 
8 Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest, 125. 
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The indoctrination process of halqa uses the traditional method of Islamic 
education in which the teacher holds the authority to transfer knowledge to his 
or her students without encouraging criticism or debate. The process of learning 
begins with each member having to read out a passage of the book under study; 
the supervisor then invites members to raise questions related to the passage and 
its relevance to contemporary developments, and later he or she will answer 
them. For female activists, the process takes more time to complete a book than 
for fellow male activists, as they use the Arabic version while the latter use 
Indonesian translations. In the process, each member has to read out the Arabic 
passage and translate it into Indonesian before moving on into the question and 
answer session.9 As a comparison, the male group may take one year to 
complete studying the book Nizam al-Islam, while the female group may take 
two years.10 At each halqa meeting, HTI members usually study two or three 
paragraphs of set text, depending on the capability of the members to 
comprehend them. 
  
The supervisors are responsible for the indoctrination and behavioural 
development of their members. They are full hizbiyyin who regard this 
supervision as an obligation for developing da'wa. Indeed, as HT requires, each 
full member will be assigned to become a supervisor. Their task is not only 
related to halqa supervision, but they also help members to enhance their basic 
knowledge of Islam and religious practices (ibada) such as prayer, fasting and 
reciting the Qur'an correctly. They also monitor the daily behaviour of members 
away from the halqa cells. In this way, they become religious mentors for those 
members who might have problems in lives. Self-awareness and self-discipline 
are implanted, especially in the new recruits; for example, any who come more 
than 15 minutes late after the halqa begins will not be allowed to join in the 
session.11 Thus the presence of the supervisors is crucial in directing, implanting 
                                                 
9 Information gained from interviews with several HTI members in Makassar. 
10 Interview with Hernawati, 29 December 2008. 
11 Interview with Maryam, Makassar, 9 January 2009. 
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and maintaining the ideological, political and religious beliefs of HT in new 
recruits and members alike.  
 
Apart from running the intensive halqa, supervisors also suggest additional 
learning for their members which they call ‘individual learning’ (Dirasah 
Fardiyyah, DF) and ‘additional insight’ (Tsaqafah Tambahan).12 This is aimed 
at broadening the ideological comprehension of the members and training them 
to analyse social and political events based on the HT perspectives which they 
have acquired. In relation to individual learning, the supervisors ask their cell 
members to read at home a particular book or item of information from the 
media on some actual issue. In response to the global financial crisis, for 
instance, members were encouraged to read an Islamic economic text under the 
guidance of their supervisor. The following week, they meet their supervisor to 
present the results of their reading. On such occasions, the supervisor also uses 
the session to test members’ understanding of HT ideology as gained from 
intensive halqa, as well to check their political insight (Wawasan Politik, 
WASPOL).13  
 
As part of ideological indoctrination, the supervisor will guide the members to 
produce answers and analyses in accord with HT ideology. This presentation 
and examination meeting is called the ‘weekly following activity’ (Mutataba'at 
Usbu'iyah, MU). On the other hand, ‘additional culture’ sessions are held at 
special times, different from halqa and MU. The texts chosen for study are taken 
from the ‘unadopted canon’, which are not used in the intensive halqa. 
According to HTI female members, the first book used is entitled Min 
Muqawwimat an-Nafsiyah al-Islamiyah (Pillars of the Islamic Personality), 
author anonymous, published under HTI imprimatur. It contains a range of 
Qur’anic verses and Hadith under various themes of Islamic personality 
building. It is interesting to note that female hizbiyyin customarily use familiar 
abbreviations to refer to their activities and books, such as MU (Mutataba'at 
                                                 
12 It seems that this additional learning process is applied only to female hizbiyyin as I did not 
gain any information related to this from male hizbiyyin.  
13 Interview with Mujahidah and Farah, Makassar, 23 December 2009. 
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Usbu'iyah), DF (Dirasah Rardiyah), Waspol (Wawasan Politik) and MM (Min 
Muqawwimat). Given all these various learning activities, the hizbiyyin are kept 
busy, attending three sessions a week, which include halqa, MU and Tsaqafah 
Tambahan.    
                   
         
Texts as a Basis for Indoctrination 
As we have seen, initial indoctrination through intensive halqa seems essential 
to mould the minds of the new recruits, the daris and to familiarise introductory 
HT doctrines. Halqa, in the first place, may attract them to keep participating 
and eventually lead them on to become actual members. Most of the hizbiyyin I 
met deny that they have been indoctrinated, arguing that membership to HTI is 
contingent upon the choice of the individual. They emphasize that their decision 
to participate in HTI is due to a ‘process of thinking’ (proses berfikir). These 
members apparently do not realize that they have been indoctrinated through the 
weekly halqa. In fact, the adoption of HT ideology through ‘the process of 
thinking’, as they stress, is part of an indoctrination in the initial phase, because 
of the material they receive in the first book of halqa, namely Nizam al-Islam 
(the System of Islam).  
 
While there have been various explanations of the differences between 
indoctrination and instruction, scholars of education suggest that indoctrination 
can be distinguished from instruction in terms of intention, method and 
content.14 According to John Wilson, indoctrination is being carried out when it 
is intended that the student arrive at a certain belief.15 In the case of HT, 
indoctrination is to be identified, at least judging from the intention of halqa to 
implant ideology in individuals and the method of education which directs 
members to adopt An-Nabhanism without critical inquiry. Indeed, HTI activists 
themselves prefer to name their form of learning ‘tatsqif’ (culturing) rather than 
‘ta’lim’ (teaching) or ‘tarbiyyah’ (education). What is more, the limiting of 
                                                 
14 Snook, Concepts of Indoctrination, 2. 
15 John Wilson, “Indoctrination and Rationality” in Snook, (ed.), Concepts of Indoctrination, 18-
19. 
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references for study to those written only by An-Nabhani and other HT authors 
indicates that indoctrination is the method of education in HT. 
 
There are three books studied by new recruits before they progress to actual 
membership: Nizam al-Islam (The System of Islam), At-Takattul al-Hizbiy (The 
Party Structure) and Mafahim Hizbut Tahrir (The Concepts of Hizbut Tahrir). 
The systematic order of presenting material indicates that HT employs a series 
of subtle and sophisticated stages of indoctrination for novices: the three basic 
books serve to equip the minds of novices with HT principal doctrines before 
receiving further doctrines on more detailed topics such as politics, economy 
and society in Islam.  Interestingly, the first two books do not mention HT on 
any page; only the third presents HT concepts. The impact of the basic books 
upon HTI members appears to be strong; I heard many terms and concepts 
derived from the books voiced in the interviews that I conducted. Therefore, I 
find it important to give a brief description of the works as follows: 
 
1. Nizam al-Islam (Peraturan Hidup dalam Islam, The System of Islam) 
This book briefly addresses broad and various topics in Islam, such as faith 
(iman), the Islamic system, Islamic civilization, Islamic law (shari’a), Traditions 
of the Life of the Prophet (As-Sunna), Islamic ethics (akhlak) and so forth. It 
also contains the draft constitution of the Islamic caliphal state formulated by 
An-Nabhani. Using theological arguments, it enjoins Muslims to use their 
thinking (mafahim) based on Islamic faith (iman) and to hold totally to the laws 
of God. The power of the book lies in its philosophical, theological and 
historical elaboration for arguing that Islam is the most true and rational 
ideology (mabda’) compared to other ideologies, such as capitalism and 
socialism.  
 
2. At-Takattul al-Hizbiy (The Party Structure) 
Drawing on the ideological competition between Pan-Arabism and Pan-
Islamism in the Middle East during the 1950s, this book explains the 
weaknesses and failures of movements based on Islam, nationalism and 
communism in dealing with the umma. These it regards as movements without a 
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correct ideology. The book underlines the significance of having a party rather 
than a social-spiritual organization to struggle for Islam. It describes the several 
stages, with relevant strategies, in which a party can establish an Islamic state, 
namely from culturing, interaction with the umma, to the taking over of political 
power with the support of the umma. As well, it notes possible barriers in 
undertaking this da’wa and practical measures to adopt in the struggle.  
  
3. Mafahim Hizbut Tahrir (The Concepts of Hizbut Tahrir)   
This book describes the concepts adopted by HT. It urges Muslims to revive 
Islam’s glory by returning to a true understanding of the faith, namely an Islam 
which has both clear thought (fikrah) and method (tariqa). It proposes HT as the 
only party which struggles for such an Islam, with the aim of re-establishing 
Islamic life all over the world under the caliphate. Various discussions of the 
principles of shari’a (ushul fiqh) and method of da’wa are provided to support 
HT’s struggle. At the end of the book, there is a two page profile of HT. 
 
 
Youth and Susceptibility to HTI Indoctrination 
One of the characteristics shared by transnational Islamist movements active in 
Indonesia, especially HTI and the Tarbiyah Movement is in terms of their 
demographies. Most members of the movements belong to the younger 
generation, particularly university students in the ‘secular’ campuses of big 
cities. Moreover, the interaction with transnational Islamist ideas mostly takes 
place on campuses through personal student contact, public discussions and 
training sessions organized by the Da'wa Preaching Institute (LDK) or disguised 
study clubs of the movements. Recruitment and indoctrination, as we have 
discussed, seem essential to gain adherents among these young students. It is 
important therefore to address the issue of why the youth are susceptible to 
global Islamist ideology and indoctrination. I suggest that the explanation lies in 
the nature of the youth themselves, who are seeking an identity on the one hand 
and the appeal of HT ideology through indoctrination, which provides a sense of 
certainty to the youth on the other hand. 
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Seeking Social Bonds and Relief from Frustration  
Several scholarly works have argued that youth are prone to join mass 
movements and new religious movements. As HTI members mostly become 
acquainted with and join the movement during the period of their university 
studies, it can be estimated that their age in early participation is around 18 to 
22. According to Lois Flaherty, for young adults in their early 20s, this is the 
time when they consolidate their identity and seek commitment.16 She points out 
that during this period “many young people are still unsettled, trying to work out 
their relationship to the world. They are determined to make a difference, 
through changing themselves or the outside world.”17 In this context, religious 
movements are one of the institutions which serve to provide and construct a 
total identity to young people, through what Castells has called ‘the process of 
indivuation and internalization’.18  
 
With regard to HTI members in Makassar, most come from rural areas in South 
Sulawesi, or from several other provinces in South Sulawesi, as well as from 
Eastern Indonesian areas such as Kalimantan, Ambon and Nusa Tenggara. 
Many young people in Eastern Indonesia have traveled to Makassar in order to 
gain better education and employment. Being away from their homes, they 
become urbanised, interacting with the results of rapid development and 
modernization and living independently. For some young people, this condition 
can create a sense of alienation due to a lack of social ties in the city. In 
addition, the loosening of traditional religious structures due to the impact of 
massive globalization can lead them to feel confused and under siege. By 
engaging with a religious community like HTI, they can overcome these 
feelings, establishing new social bonds and enjoying the strong solidarity among 
members. One activist said:              
 
I am from Ternate, Maluku… I feel secure with my membership in HTI. 
I am the only daughter in my family. My family trusts me to pursue my 
                                                 
16 Lois T. Flaherty, “Youth, Ideology, and Terrorism”, in Lois T. Flaherty (ed.), Adolescent 
Psychiatry (London: Career and Technical Education, 2003) 46. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Vol. II, The Power of 
Identity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999) 7. 
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studies here (in Makassar). I have no family here. Because of the ‘sister 
solidarity’ (ikatan ukhuwah) in HTI, my family believes that I can take 
care of myself and maintain my right behaviour. Besides, the social 
interaction (pergaulan) in HTI is also good.19
 
In the HTI community, young people form new and strong social relationships. 
Brotherhood and sisterhood is not only established among members of one 
campus but also with those on other campuses, who further widen their 
networks and friendships. The members often emphasize that what unites them 
in HTI is one belief (aqidah) and ideology, regardless of background, nation, 
ethnic community or occupation. This interaction among members with 
different backgrounds is enabled when they organize or participate in HTI's 
various activities in Makassar. The strength of brotherhood and sisterhood can 
be seen from their way of addressing each other as ‘akhi’ (brother) for fellow 
male activists and ‘ukhti’ (sister) for fellow female ones. Reducing differences 
among members, it seems that this new shelter provides a sense of 
egalitarianism and self-esteem among them as they share the concern to spread 
da’wa among the umma.   
 
The HTI movement also serves as an outlet for young people to express their 
frustration. Facing the complexities of life in a big city with various choices of 
modernity could shake youthful identity. Moreover, the economic crisis since 
1998, which has led to the rise of unemployment and economic hardship, might 
contribute to a greater uncertainty and fear for the future among students and 
graduates. On the one hand, their families hope for high achievement in their 
study, yet on the other hand, they have limited sources of funds and facilities. 
Based on my observations, most HTI members are city dwellers, educated and 
come from middle and lower income families. Few HTI members hold good 
professional positions as lecturers, doctors or government employees (Pegawai 
Negeri Sipil, PNS). Rather, many of them are students or unemployed graduates 
who engage in small business to survive while waiting for an opportunity to 
apply for government service. In relation to these economic factors, youth who 
lack direction, satisfactory achievement and meaning in their life are more likely 
                                                 
19 Interview with Hernawati, Makassar, 29 December 2008. 
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to join radical religious movements like HTI. Moreover, the HTI messages 
which provide ready-made answers to their problems appear appealing to such 
disaffected youths. At an HTI Muslimah rally in Makassar, I saw leaflets which 
stated: 
 
… Muslimah HTI calls on Indonesian women to abandon capitalism. In 
reality, capitalism fails to guarantee the welfare and prosperity of the 
people and even makes them suffer. This is because capitalism only 
offers an economic system which is unjust, vulnerable to crisis and 
identical with new colonialism… Today, Indonesia becomes a milch 
cow of America and its allies. Indonesian resources are abundant but 
many of its people live in poverty. It is not fair for us to maintain the 
domination of the capitalist ideology in Indonesia. Therefore, Muslimah 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia calls on Indonesian women to struggle for 
shari’a and the caliphate. With shari’a, we can have Islamic ideology, 
derived from God. It is an Islamic economic system, based on Islamic 
ideology, which can bring prosperity to the people and make a great, 
strong and leading country… 20
      
 
The messages of HTI are often framed in revolutionary language which accords 
with the psychology of the youth, who tend to be rebellious. Moreover, 
resistance in the form of street demonstrations has become a new trend for 
university students, following the fall of Soeharto in May 1998, due to the force 
of student demonstrations. Participating in HTI action, the youth can show 
themselves to be the representatives of the people against injustice and 
oppression, raising their self-esteem and confidence. At a glance, the messages 
in their pamphlets and banners sound like a socialist or leftist movement in 
terms of their radical rejection of capitalism and imperialism. These common 
messages state that Muslims and the Indonesian people are victims of un-Islamic 
ideologies implanted by the West in order to colonize the Muslim world. The 
jargon of liberation and resistance to capitalism and democracy has been raised: 
“Eliminate Capitalism, Revolution for the Caliphate!”, “Capitalism will End, the 
World Relies on Islam!”, “Leave Capitalism, Be alert about Democracy!”, 
“Caliphate Yes, Capitalism and Democracy No!” (written in English), “Save 
                                                 
20 Juru Bicara Muslimah HTI, Seruan Muslimah Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia untuk Tinggalkan 
Kapitalisme, Tegakkan Syariah dan Khilafah menuju Indonesia Besar, Kuat, dan Terdepan, 
(Jakarta: Kantor Juru Bicara Muslimah HTI, 10 Desember 2008). 
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Women from Capitalism and the Trap of Democracy!” and “Save Indonesia 
with the Shari’a and the Caliphate!".  
 
     
Caption: HTI Muslimah rally in Makassar, 20 December 2008 
 
Seeking Certainty 
When negotiating identity in a confusing world, youth are susceptible to 
religious doctrines which promise certainty. Youth who lack a background in 
the traditional Islamic education of the pesantren and those from the science and 
engineering disciplines are more receptive to HTI indoctrination. In my 
observations, I found only a few hizbiyyin from the Alauddin State Islamic 
University (UIN Alauddin) in Makassar, while many more hail from the 'secular' 
majors of campuses such as UNM, UNHAS and UMI. When looking for HTI 
activists on the UNM campus to carry out interviews, some students suggested 
that I look in the Faculty of Natural Science and Mathematics (MIPA, 
Matematika dan Ilmu Pengetahuan Alam) rather in the Faculty of Arts and 
Language. My interaction with hizbiyyin confirmed that HTI has won more 
followers from Science and Engineering than from the disciplines of Religious 
Studies, Social Sciences and Arts. Having a new awareness to return to religion, 
these students with less Islamic education are more likely to seek ‘right’ and 
‘wrong’ answers and so are prone to take for granted HTI ideas. Similarly, the 
students of Science and Engineering tend to employ the 'natural science' 
paradigm and so accept the doctrines of HTI as something fixed and final. In 
this respect, to borrow Shamsul's words for describing da’wa-oriented students 
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in Malaysia, “they see ‘Islamic knowledge’ and ‘Islamic theology’ in terms of 
rules, formulae, equations and right and wrong answers”.21 As a result, their 
understanding of Islam appears legalistic and black and white. 
 
Thus the HTI doctrines, which appear clear, comprehensive and not speculative 
make sense to young adults who are in search of certainty. It is common that 
fundamentalist religious movements provide “a unifying philosophy of life” 
from which the followers can meet personal needs for meaning and coherence in 
their existence.22 In this regard, religious texts form the core from which 
fundamentalists justify their thought and action. HTI sees the sacred texts of the 
Qur'an and Hadith through the lens of An-Nabhani's commentary, claiming 
them to be fixed Islamic teachings which are infallible. An-Nabhani created an 
Islamic ideology which encompasses various aspects of life such as politics, 
economics, society, law and ethics, suggesting the comprehensiveness of Islam. 
Indeed, he authored various works covering myriad aspects which have become 
the manifesto and doctrinal sources of HT followers. Through An-Nabhani’s 
texts, the HTI members have found what Fealy calls ‘a total Islamic identity’23 
and feel no need to look at other religious interpretations. One of the hizbiyyin 
states: 
 
I have interacted with friends from various Islamic movements in 
Makassar such as the Salafi and PKS groups. However, I found there is 
something different in HTI because it places Islam as a comprehensive 
religion. In HTI, we not only study religion as ritual worship (ibadah 
ritual) or a spiritual thing, but we see religion as ideology, cultural entity 
and a basis for developing civilization. I also feel that HTI is the most 
serious movement, with its ready concepts to implement Islam 
comprehensively. Many people only discuss Islam as academic 
discourse, for example the students at IAIN. They learn Islam 
theoretically, but only to become lecturers, academicians or writers and 
then halt their steps there. But as to how to implement Islam, they do not 
have any concepts of thought or movement.24  
 
                                                 
21 Shamsul AB., “Inventing Certainties: the Da’wa Persona in Malaysia”, in Wendy James (ed.), 
The Pursuit of Certainty (London: Routledge, 1995) 130. 
22 Ralph W. Hood, JR. et.al, The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism (New York and 
London: The Guilford Press, 2005) 15-16. 
23 Fealy, "Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia",151-217. 
24 Interview with Rahim, Makassar, 14 December 2008. 
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Indoctrinated Narratives: Becoming a Re-born Muslim 
 
It can be said that amongst transnational Islamist movements, it is HT which has 
the most solid cadre building and organized form of mobilization. Although the 
members of HTI in Indonesia are small in number in comparison to the large 
organizations of Nahdatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah and Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera (PKS) they show a deep grasp and internalization of An-Nabhani's 
thoughts. This is not surprising, since they have studied the three primary books 
of An-Nabhani under the supervision of their senior member mentors and have 
exhibited sacrifice and commitment to the movement. In the words of the 
spokesperson of HTI DPD I Sulsel, “members of HT are guided by a belief in 
HT ideology and comprehension of its tsaqafah (insight)”.25 In this section, I 
examine the impact of intensive indoctrination upon hizbiyyin by analyzing their 
common narratives, which indicate that they have become re-born Muslims with 
a new perspective on life. Since there are various doctrines implanted in the HTI 
members, I underline the key doctrines which they repeatedly expressed during 
public rallies and my interviews with them. 
 
     
Islam as a Total Ideology 
One central doctrine which is adhered to by hizbiyyin is the view of Islam as a 
total ideology (mabda’). Many members acknowledged that this view was new 
for them at the first time they joined the halqa but that it grew in its appeal for 
recruits. It is initially introduced from An-Nabhani’s first book, Nizam al-Islam 
(The Systems of Islam) where An-Nabhani encourages Muslims to adopt Islam 
as their ideology as it is based on God; he also denounces capitalism and 
socialism as human-made ideologies. For An-Nabhani, Islamic ideology 
comprises both fikrah (ideas) and tariqah (methods), i.e. that Islam provides a 
comprehensive set of ideas derived from God and methods to achieve them by 
following the Prophet's example.26 Given this view, HTI members see Islam as 
                                                 
25 Interview with Hasanuddin Rasyid, 6 January 2009. 
26 An-Nabhani, Peraturan Hidup dalam Islam, 42-45. 
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a clear and complete system and Muslims hust need to follow the rules. One of 
the hizbiyyin explained: 
 
Compared to other movements, I see that it is only HT which has clear 
fikrah and tariqah…it is not sufficient to regard Islam merely as religion, 
it is also ideology. For me, ideology is important because it is the most 
fundamental idea. If one wants to do something, he must base his or her 
action on ideology. In any action we have to observe the shari’a - from 
getting up from sleep, eating, building a family, politics, the economy, 
social and cultural activities, to the rule of state - everything has to be 
based on Islam. So, Islam is kaffah (total) and not only confined to 
ritual.27  
 
 
The Quest for Shari’a and the Caliphate  
In HT's principles, it is obligatory for Muslims to uphold the shari’a. It has to be 
totally implemented through the authority of an Islamic state (Daulah 
Islamiyah) as experienced by the Prophet and the first Righteous Caliphs. HTI 
members view Indonesia, and Muslim countries in the Middle East, as not 
entirely Islamic since they apply kufur, or infidel systems. For the hizbiyyin, the 
caliphate is the only means to ensure the total implementation of shari’a. Based 
on this logic, they see that establishing a caliphate is also an obligation for 
Muslims. HTI members I met were well informed and eloquent about the 
caliphate, not only providing doctrinal and historical arguments for the 
institution, but they also described in detail the structure of the caliphal state, 
such as the requirements and methods of appointing a caliph, the function of 
wali (governors), administrative matters, the form of Islamic courts, and so 
forth. Hizbiyyin are well-informed about these details because they have grasped 
them during halqa. I found two HT books which discuss the details of the 
Islamic state and the caliphate, namely Daulah Islam (The Islamic State)28 and 
Struktur Negara Khalifah (Structure of the Caliphal State).29 Their contents are 
echoed in the narratives of hizbiyyin. Here is a typical example: 
                                                 
27 Interview with Farah, Makassar, 23 December 2009. 
28 Taqiuddin An-Nabhani, Daulah Islam (Jakarta: HTI Press, 2007). 
29 Hizbut Tahrir, Ajhizah ad-Dawlah al-Khilafah, translated into Indonesian, Struktur Negara 
Khilafah: Pemerintahan dan Administrasi (Jakarta: HTI Press, 2007). 
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 For me, what I understand from HT's struggle is the implementation of 
shari’a. Yet, we cannot implement shari’a without a state. We offer the 
benefits of shari’a to be implemented all over the world, but we have no 
institution which maintains and spreads shari’a. Therefore, establishing 
a caliphate is obligatory. Shari’a implementation cannot be won only in 
one country, it must have a great power guaranteeing the unity of the 
umma under one institution, namely the caliphate. It is the caliphate 
which guards and spreads faith (akidah) and God’s shari’a. I believe that 
some day the caliphate will be established because God and the Prophet 
have promised us. It is funny if Muslims themselves do not believe, 
because even the US former president, Bush himself believes that there 
will be an Islamic institution which will take over the world. I am 100% 
sure that the caliphate will be established. We just need more effort and 
the readiness of the umma. Therefore, HT is struggling to enlighten the 
umma, to prepare them towards the caliphate.30
 
Besides relying on doctrinal sources as formulated by An-Nabhani, the HTI 
members often use the historical glory of Islam to argue for the caliphate. They 
perceive that the condition of Islam in the past, when ruled by a caliph, was 
much better than the existing situation. One of the activists stated that in the 
world today one can see human killing and rape taking place every minute. He 
boasted that during Islam’s rule for 13 centuries it could overcome criminality 
better than today, and this has been acknowledged by some Western 
Orientalists.31 Another informant told me of the greatness of the Islamic state in 
Madina where Muslims, Christians and Jews could co-exist in harmony. He also 
described how science, arts and literature were highly developed in the age of 
the Abbasid dynasty of Baghdad. It is worth noting that the narratives of 
hizbiyyin seem uncritical with regard to Islamic history. Like HT literature, what 
one hears from hizbiyyin narratives is, as Fealy rightly states, “an idealized and 
romanticized account of how the caliphate operated throughout history”.32        
 
Resistance to Western Concepts: Against Capitalism and Democracy 
As a part of their indoctrination, the quest for the caliphate and the 
implementation of shari’a leads hizbiyyin to denounce alien ideologies and 
                                                 
30 Interview with Putri, Makassar, 14 January 2009.  
31 Interview with Ansar, Makassar, 10 January  
32 Fealy, “Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia”, 163. 
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‘isms’, especially those coming from the West, such as capitalism, socialism, 
secularism and pluralism. Since socialism has been shown to have failed, the 
energies of HTI seem more concentrated towards undermining capitalism and 
democracy, to judge from the voices they raise in the media and their rallies. In 
any HTI rally and whatever the issue canvassed, one finds voices against 
capitalism and democracy. What is more, in the HT literature, capitalism and 
democracy are denounced as the systems of infidels (sistem kufur), the spawn of 
secularism, full of weaknesses, sources of evil and soft weapons of the West to 
weaken and colonize the Muslim countries. Rather than making self-criticism, 
HTI members usually blame these Western systems as the source of the 
problems facing Muslim countries in general. Following HT literature, one of 
the hizbiyyin narrated: 
 
One cause of the decline of Muslims is the domination of the capitalist 
system with its democracy. In other words, capitalism is established 
while Islam is abandoned. That is why HT struggles to replace 
capitalism with an Islamic system. Capitalism only brings decline and 
bad effects. In reality, this system has failed to bring prosperity to the 
umma; for example, as we face now, the global financial and economic 
crisis. In Indonesia, we have seen the presidency has changed 
overtime, but has never brought any betterment: oil is still scarce, the 
health service is not optimal and other aspects of people's lives have 
not been improved. These are all the bad impacts of capitalism and 
thus they should be replaced with an Islamic system. It is an 
undeniable fact that, historically, Islam could bring prosperity to the 
umma. For instance, in the rule of the caliph Umar bin Abdul Azis, 
there was a time where people refused to be given alms (zakat) because 
they were all so prosperous.33  
  
 
Emphasizing the clash of civilizations, the hizbiyyin reject democracy; for them 
it is a secular concept which is more firmly based on the sovereignty of the 
people rather than on the rules of God. In their view, within a democratic system 
any issue whatsoever, whether halal (allowed) or haram (forbidden) might be 
brought under deliberation, while in Islam only issues which are halal can be 
discussed. Moreover, they emphasize that matters of Islamic law such as jinayat 
(criminality) and qisas (punishment) cannot be debated, but have to be strictly 
                                                 
33 Interview with Hernawati, Makassar, 29 December 2008. 
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implemented. Quoting HTI ideologues, several members argue that democracy 
is haram from an Islamic perspective. Due to this rejection of democracy, as my 
informant explained, hizbiyyin in Indonesia do not participate in elections, 
though this is not publicly announced and there is no stipulation from HTI DPP 
in Jakarta regarding the issue.   
 
 
Self-Transformation: Producing a New Identity 
The intensive indoctrination of HTI not only results in shaping the minds of the 
hizbiyyin as described above, but also leads them to experience transformations 
in their lives. Viewed from the perspective of the sociology of religion, the 
change in belief and identity of these youths indicates that they have undergone 
a total conversion.34 Adopting a complete Islamic identity, many members 
acknowledged that they have found direction in their lives. As they narrated: 
 
After joining HTI, I personally found a goal in life which I really 
wanted. Before knowing Islam and HT, my goal in life was like what 
people generally want, such as achievement in my studies, getting a 
good job, getting married, having a family and kids and then entering 
heaven after death. But after knowing Islam through HTI, I now realize 
that da’wa is the axis of life (poros hidup). Thus, we have to provide a 
time for da’wa. Our obligation is not only to perform ritual worship, 
but also to spread da’wa for the good of the umma. Therefore, although 
I am busy with my studies I have to manage my time to include 
da’wa.35   
 
After learning Islam in HTI, I felt a change in my views. Previously, 
like other friends, I just thought about completing my studies, finding a 
job and then getting married, as well as making my parents happy. 
That's it. Now, after joining HTI, I do think there was something 
missing in my life. We should not only think about our individual 
interests, but we have to pay attention to the umma and struggle for 
Islam. We not only have to make sure our prayers are good, but also 
how to think about the problems of the umma, how to enlighten them 
to support Islamic shari’a so that together we can enjoy prosperity 
under Islam.36            
 
                                                 
34 David A. Snow an Richard Machalek, "The Sociology of Conversion", in  Annual Review of 
Sociology 10 (1984), 167-190. 
35 Interview with Putri, Makassar, 14 January 2009. 
36 Interview with Mutiara, Makassar, 25 December 2008. 
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 The stories make clear that the hizbiyyin have become re-born Muslims. 
Narratives like these are common in new religious movements. According to 
Margaret Thaler Singer, members of a new religious movement, when referring 
to their new social identity, speak of themselves as “transformed, reborn, 
enlightened, empowered, rebirthed, or cleared”.37 In this respect, their change is 
reconstructed as demonstrating the emergence of the ‘new person’.38 The 
hizbiyyin perceive themselves to be agents of God, having a new consciousness 
and commitment to spread da’wa, which they view as the major activity of life 
on earth. They have found a high responsibility to care and struggle for the 
global umma so that they can restore the glory of Islam under the caliphate.  
 
Such personal change can also be seen from the appearance and behaviour of the 
hizbiyyin. While male activists do not adopt any particular change of 
appearance, the female activists, or akhwat tend to put on a different model of 
veil and a loose, long flowing robe, which appear more traditional than the 
general jilbab in Indonesia. They have learned in the religious doctrines of halqa 
that Islamic clothing consists of jilbab and khimar. The jilbab is a headscarf 
combined with a long robe, while khimar is the headscarf combined with 
separate items of clothing such as a shirt and skirt. This kind of jilbab has 
become the badge of the religious and social identity of the HT female activists. 
In terms of behaviour, they keep their actions in accordance with Islamic rules 
and ethics; for instance, except in the context of gaining education, they avoid 
interacting personally with males with whom they are potentially allowed to be 
married, bukan muhrimnya, or those outside the circle of the family with whom 
they may interact freely. This is due to the teaching that it is forbidden for a man 
and a woman to meet and interact in a private place without the presence of 
others, since it can lead to zina, or sexual acts outside of marriage. In my own 
experience, I had difficulty in interviewing any female activist unless she was 
accompanied by a female friend as chaperone. One of my informants even 
                                                 
37  Margaret Thaler Singer, “The Process of Brainwashing, Psychological Coercion, and 
Thought Reform”, in Lorne L. Dawson (ed.), Cults and New Religious Movements, 158. 
38 Ibid. 
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cancelled an interview when her friend was not available to come and 
accompany her.                  
 
The hizbiyyin do not confine their ‘Islamicness’ to personal piety, as in other 
Islamist movements, but following HT doctrines, through real action as they are 
bound to the global da’wa mission. This may be interpreted as the success of 
HTI indoctrination which produces such a strong commitment in young 
Muslims. For them, commitment to HTI is no more than a commitment to Islam 
itself. The da’wa mission to establish shari’a and the caliphate is embodied deep 
in the minds and actions of the hizbiyyin. They are not reluctant to spread HTI 
messages to their family and the public. Some members gave me accounts of 
how they have struggled to Islamize their family and their social surroundings, 
receiving both resistance and acceptance in turn. Some of them are also active in 
writing their opinions in local daily newspapers on various national and local 
issues, always offering solutions from HT perspectives. While so seeking to 
Islamize their surroundings, the major activity of the hizbiyyin is in seeking 
recruits, attending and supervising halqa and actively organizing and 
participating in HT public activities such as seminars or discussions, 
demonstrations and rallies.    
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown the relationship between commitment, indoctrination 
and the vulnerability of youth in being attracted to the HTI movement. It finally 
concludes that intensive indoctrination through halqa plays a crucial role in 
moulding the minds and behaviour of these young Muslims, which in turn 
produces an Islamic identity and commitment to HTI. Indoctrination takes the 
form of traditional Islamic teaching, where a teacher is surrounded by five or six 
students in the halqa, following the systematic curriculum written by An-
Nabhani. Rather than using any critical method, HTI aims to implant HT 
ideology in young Muslims under the supervision of senior hizbiyyin, so that 
members can adopt and carry out its teaching correctly.  
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For its certain, uncompromising and revolutionary messages, the HTI ideology 
is appealing to youth, especially to disaffected university students, who are at 
the stage of seeking personal empowerment and identity, social bonds and an 
avenue to vent their frustrations. The hizbiyyin thus emerge as re-born Muslims 
who adopt a total Islamic ideology and conceive of the da’wa for shari’a and 
the caliphate as their main undertaking in life. 
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 CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia after the fall of Soeharto regime has become 
an exemplary manifestation of the rapid expansion of transnational Islamist 
movements in Southeast Asia. After being an underground movement since the 
early 1980s due to repressive nature of the New Order regime, Hizbut Tahrir 
emerged to public view in 2000 and has gained a high profile since. In the past 
decade, HTI has dramatically increased its membership and energetically 
mobilized its followers on the streets. It has consistently campaigned for its global 
agenda, namely to restore caliphate and implement shari’a. This global movement 
has attracted particularly young Muslims, who display a deep comprehension of 
HT ideology and fervent commitment to it. In an attempt to understand the rapid 
development and growing popularity of HT in Indonesia, this sub-thesis has 
scrutinized the processes and appeals which entice people to join and become 
committed members to the movement. This study is different from others on HTI 
in that it focuses on the grassroots, investigating internal perspectives of HTI 
members in Makassar, South Sulawesi.  
 
Many scholars have referred to the rise of HTI and other Islamist movements as a 
response to rapid socio-political and economic change. In this respect, uneven 
development, poverty, rapid urbanization, state failures, and identity crises are 
among the factors which lead people to express their grievances by engaging in 
Islamist movements. In Indonesia, the mushrooming of Islamist groups was 
notable in transition era from authoritarian to new democratic state. The failure of 
government to overcome instability due to economic crises, and its inability to 
ensure law and order as well as ethnic-religious conflicts are among explanations 
of the rise of Islamist groups during this time. In addition, the emergence of these 
groups is also seen as a reaction to the restrictions on political Islam during the 
authoritarian Soeharto regime.    
 
I have argued in this study that while social-political factors, in effect external 
factors, are undeniable in explaining the emergence of HTI and the grievances of 
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 its members, they cannot fully explain the reasons why individuals participate in 
HTI and not other radical groups. Therefore, I underscore the importance of 
internal factors, namely ideology, strategies, and activities of HTI in building 
membership through innovative recruitment and indoctrination techniques. In this 
regard, external and internal factors operate simultaneously. Emphasizing only 
one factor can lead to inadequate analysis. 
 
My central argument in this study has been that recruitment and indoctrination 
techniques and processes play a pivotal role in HTI achieving high participation 
and commitment of its members. I have demonstrated that outreach is essential to 
persuade people to initially participate in HTI activities, such as seminars, 
trainings, and halqa, while indoctrination works to shape their thinking in order to 
make them dedicated members. In addition, intensive indoctrination and 
socialization among hizbiyyin serves to maintain their unity of thought and deepen 
their conviction as to the truth of HTI beliefs.     
 
I also highlight the importance of social bonds in recruiting new members and 
maintaining their dedication to HTI. My investigation of hizbiyyin in South 
Sulawesi reveals that most of HTI's recruitment has been through interpersonal 
relations; inviting people with whom there is an existing trusting relationship to 
attend HTI activities. Many young Muslims have been recruited after being 
persuaded and urged by their families, friends, and seniors who were affiliated to 
HTI. This implies that HTI's ideology is not the sole or even primary factor 
drawing people into HTI. As Stark and Bainbridge noted, “rather being drawn to 
the group [religious sect] because of its ideology, people were drawn to the 
ideology because of their ties to the group”.1 This confirms the finding of studies 
on Christian religious sects and cults in America, showing that effective 
recruitment through pre-existing social networks and interpersonal ties can also be 
applied to radical Islamist movement.  
 
                                                 
1  Stark and Bainbridge, “Networks of Faith”, 1378-1379 
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 What is more, the active recruitment of hizbiyyin has marked similarities to 
American evangelists in making acquaintances for conversion. In this regard, they 
make a close contact with new acquaintances by giving personal attention, 
support, and care with the objective of guiding them towards HTI. Once the new 
relationship is established, hizbiyyin will manage to keep contact with prospective 
recruits and intensely approach them using HTI da’wa messages through physical 
contacts and communication means. In this way, they also try to convince the 
prospective recruits by involving them in emotional and intellectual discussions 
showing that Islam is essential in dealing with human problems. When individuals 
become recruits, they are conditioned to form tight social bonds with other 
members, supporting and advising each other, which in turn can make them feel a 
sense of belonging to and dependence on the movement. 
 
My observations in South Sulawesi indicate that HTI branches in local contexts 
use innovative approaches to win support from society. Although various issues 
raised in its public activities are more pre-occupied with actual international and 
national issues, HTI in the region incorporates local elements, such as presenting 
Makassarese cultural performance within its seminars or connecting events in 
Sulawesi to its global agenda. Furthermore, it attracts public to support its global 
agenda by framing issues in a way which gives the impression that HTI is loyal to 
the Indonesian nation-state and cares about people's suffering. This is the HTI 
strategy for gaining support by ‘localizing’ its global agenda in an Indonesian 
context.  
 
This study also found that disguising HTI study clubs and their activities serves as 
an effective strategy for HTI recruitment, especially in campuses. I have observed 
that HTI has a number of ‘undercover’ study clubs using various names in several 
leading campuses in South Sulawesi. This cloaking pattern is similar with that of 
HT recruitment in universities in the UK where hizbiyyin create Muslims student 
society without referring to HT when organizing their seminars. To attract 
students, the HTI-affiliated study clubs raise intellectual or religious issues which 
accommodate students’ interests. This masking strategy gives an impression of 
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 non-partisanship and hides their radical agenda from students so that HT ideas can 
be quietly inserted into discussions seemingly on purely religious or social topics.  
 
The South Sulawesi case suggests that the vigorous recruitment of HTI members 
is not driven by political and economic motives, but by HT ideology implanted to 
them. For the members, recruitment is seen as a da’wa or preaching activity 
which provides the theological basis upon which are erected elaborate programs. 
HTI indoctrinates its members in three stages of da’wa development: the stage of 
culturing, the stage of interaction with the umma, and the stage of taking over the 
government. The first stage forms the basis for individual recruitment and 
indoctrination, while the second one forms the basis for educating society. These 
da’wa doctrines, which are based on An-Nabhani's interpretations of Islamic texts 
and Prophetic example, are closely studied by members and provide the 
guidelines for them to seek recruits and propagate HTI messages to individuals 
and society. Hizbiyyin view da’wa as a religious obligation and main duty in life, 
which has similar position with obligatory worship in Islam. They also regard 
da’wa as inseparable from political activity.  
 
Having indicated the importance of recruitment, this study however, does not 
discount the appeal of HTI's totalising ideology, its framings, and its utopian 
promises. Prospective members can see these features of HTI when reading its 
media, attending HTI public activities, or attending its training and indoctrination 
programs. Most of hizbiyyin maintain that HTI's teaching and struggle is more 
Islamic and comprehensive (kaffah) than those of other movements. None of them 
appear to discern weakness in HTI and critical thinking is not encouraged. HTI 
teaching for them is comprehensive because HTI views Islam not only as a 
religion and ritual thing but also as an ideology (mabda’) that provides complete 
rules for all aspects of Muslim lives. It is apparent that they are convinced by HTI 
arguments and framings, and find confirmation of its ideological correctness in 
political events. For them, the restoration of caliphate and implementation of 
shari’a becomes the sweeping solution for all the problems which beset Muslim 
countries, including Indonesia.  
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 Nonetheless, participation of young Muslims in HTI is not a sudden process as 
becoming a full member requires long preparation. This lengthy process is 
important for several reasons. First, although HTI is active in recruitment, it only 
inducts recruits who intensely study HT ideology and show commitment to the 
movement. Second, HTI has a strong cadreship in which it implements strict 
discipline for prospective members, such as requiring them to adopt An-
Nabhanism in thinking and daily practices, as a requirement for membership. 
Third, the lengthy period of study and interaction serves as socialization process 
for recruits to negotiate and develop their commitment to the movement. This 
socialization process also becomes a means for recruits to decide if they really 
want to become members.  
 
Another main concern of this study is indoctrination process. It is the most 
important medium for determining membership and commitment to HTI. I have 
shown how indoctrination through weekly halqa can influence young Muslims to 
be dedicated followers. The recruits and members are not encouraged to question 
and criticize HTI doctrines as they are regarded as the fixed and infallible Islamic 
teaching. For HTI, what is needed from members is to understand and internalize 
HT ideology in their own thinking and behaviour rather than to exercise objective 
and critical analysis. In this regard, it is implanted in them that commitment to 
HTI means commitment to Islam. Bound by an-Nabhanism, the viewpoints of 
hizbiyyin in understanding Islam and world events become single-minded and 
narrow. It is apparent that the impact of intensive indoctrination to hizbiyyin is so 
strong that they articulate their thoughts about Islam as ideology, the need for 
shari’a and caliphate, and rejection to Western concepts using similar terms and 
phraseology, as if they have been programmed. Implanted by ‘comprehensive’ 
Islamic identity, hizbiyyin have been transformed into born-again Muslims who 
willingly dedicate their lives for Islam under the direction of HTI.  
 
My study has shown that the receptiveness of recruits to HTI indoctrination is 
related to their social and personal backgrounds. Psychologically, young adults 
who are in the stage of seeking identity and empowerment are susceptible to HTI 
radical doctrines which are certain and fixed. I have demonstrated that this 
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 identity seeking can be related to feelings of uncertainty and alienation due to 
economic instability and the rapid modernization and globalization. Those who 
come from science and engineering academic backgrounds and who lack Islamic 
education are receptive to HTI doctrines which offer certainty. Moreover, the 
newly urbanized young Muslims who lack social ties and religious hold due to 
rapid modernization and globalization are prone to join the movement. During 
indoctrination and engagement in the movement, young Muslims can gain a sense 
of safety, strong social ties, and an outlet for expressing their frustrations. Gaining 
these personal and social benefits, they continue to follow required activities of 
HTI which in process make them as committed hizbiyyin.  
 
In future, HTI is likely to continue to gain followers from among young Muslims. 
Its various study clubs in campuses and the attraction of HTI to youth still make 
campuses as the main basis for recruitment, though there are some indications that 
HTI is beginning to recruit students from senior high schools either in the city or 
rural areas. This is also supported by the fact that the local Muslim student 
organizations such as HMI and PMII are deemed incapable to provide ‘Islamic’ 
appeal and credentials to students. Within society, HTI is likely to gain sympathy 
from local Muslims due to its peaceful activities and its numerous public events 
which show up its image as the defender of the umma. Nevertheless, given the 
moderate nature of Indonesia's Muslim majority, it is unlikely that this public 
sympathy mean that HTI will gain support to establish its global goals. The 
increasing number of HTI members and its rapid mobilization may have more 
potential to affect the government's policies in the future. However, the absence of 
HTI from electoral politics will not provide a political venue for the movement to 
achieve its agenda. More importantly, its global caliphal agenda is far too distant 
from moderate Muslim majority, let alone from the diverse groups of Indonesian 
population. Its expansion will also face barriers from moderate Muslim 
organisations which seek to resist losing members to HTI by promoting Islam and 
human rights, democracy, and pluralism. 
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